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Commit 81123e82 authored by Soby Mathew's avatar Soby Mathew
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Documentation updates for the new GIC drivers 

This patch updates the relevant documentation in ARM Trusted Firmware
for the new GIC drivers. The user-guide.md and porting-guide.md have been
updated as follows:

*  The build option to compile Trusted Firmware with different GIC drivers
   for FVP has been explained in the user-guide.md.

*  The implementation details of interrupt management framework porting
   APIs for GICv3 have been added in porting-guide.md.

*  The Linaro tracking kernel release does not work OOB in GICv3 mode.
   The instructions for changing UEFI configuration in order to run with
   the new GICv3 driver in ARM TF have been added to user-guide.md.

The interrupt-framework-design.md has been updated as follows:

*  Describes support for registering and handling interrupts targeted to EL3
   e.g. Group 0 interrupts in GICv3.

*  Describes the build option `TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT` in detail.

*  Describes preemption of TSP in S-EL1 by non secure interrupts and
   also possibly by higher priority EL3 interrupts.

*  Describes the normal world sequence for issuing `standard` SMC calls.

*  Modifies the document to correspond to the current state of interrupt
   handling in TSPD and TSP.

*  Modifies the various functions names in the document to reflect
   the current names used in code.

Change-Id: I78c9514b5be834f193405aad3c1752a4a9e27a6c
parent 8e4f8291
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docs/interrupt-framework-design.md
View file @ 81123e82
......@@ -4,14 +4,16 @@ ARM Trusted Firmware Interrupt Management Design guide
Contents :
1. [Introduction](#1-introduction)
* [Assumptions](#11-assumptions)
* [Concepts](#12-concepts)
- [Interrupt Types](#121-interrupt-types)
- [Routing Model](#122-routing-model)
- [Valid Routing Models](#123-valid-routing-models)
+ [Secure-EL1 Interrupts](#1231-secure-el1-interrupts)
+ [Non-secure Interrupts](#1232-non-secure-interrupts)
- [Mapping of Interrupt Type to Signal](#124-mapping-of-interrupt-type-to-signal)
* [Concepts](#11-concepts)
- [Interrupt Types](#111-interrupt-types)
- [Routing Model](#112-routing-model)
- [Valid Routing Models](#113-valid-routing-models)
+ [Secure-EL1 Interrupts](#1131-secure-el1-interrupts)
+ [Non-secure Interrupts](#1132-non-secure-interrupts)
+ [EL3 interrupts](#1133-el3_interrupts)
- [Mapping of Interrupt Type to Signal](#114-mapping-of-interrupt-type-to-signal)
+ [Effect of mapping of several interrupt types to one signal](#1141-effect-of-mapping-of-several-interrupt-types-to-one-signal)
- [Assumptions in Interrupt Management Framework](#12-assumptions-in-interrupt-management-framework)
2. [Interrupt Management](#2-interrupt-management)
* [Software Components](#21-software-components)
......@@ -28,10 +30,14 @@ Contents :
- [Secure Payload Dispatcher](#232-secure-payload-dispatcher)
+ [Interrupt Entry](#2321-interrupt-entry)
+ [Interrupt Exit](#2322-interrupt-exit)
+ [Test Secure Payload Dispatcher behavior](#2323-test-secure-payload-dispatcher-behavior)
+ [Test secure payload dispatcher Secure-EL1 interrupt handling](#2323-test-secure-payload-dispatcher-secure-el1-interrupt-handling)
+ [Test secure payload dispatcher non-secure interrupt handling](#2324-test-secure-payload-dispatcher-non-secure-interrupt-handling)
- [Secure Payload](#233-secure-payload)
+ [Test Secure Payload behavior](#2331-test-secure-payload-behavior)
3. [Other considerations](#3-other-considerations)
* [Implication of preempted SMC on Non-Secure Software](#31-implication-of-preempted-smc-on-non-secure-software)
1. Introduction
----------------
......@@ -63,19 +69,9 @@ objective is to implement the following two requirements.
ensures that non-secure software is able to execute in tandem with the
secure software without overriding it.
### 1.1 Assumptions
The framework makes the following assumptions to simplify its implementation.
1. All secure interrupts are handled in Secure-EL1. They can be delivered to
Secure-EL1 via EL3 but they cannot be handled in EL3. It will be possible
to extend the framework to handle secure interrupts in EL3 in the future.
### 1.1 Concepts
2. Interrupt exceptions (`PSTATE.I` and `F` bits) are masked during execution
in EL3.
### 1.2 Concepts
#### 1.2.1 Interrupt types
#### 1.1.1 Interrupt types
The framework categorises an interrupt to be one of the following depending upon
the exception level(s) it is handled in.
......@@ -92,10 +88,7 @@ the exception level(s) it is handled in.
depending upon the security state of the current execution context. It is
always handled in EL3.
In the current implementation of the framework, all secure interrupts are
treated as Secure EL1 interrupts. It will be possible for EL3 software to
configure a secure interrupt as an EL3 interrupt in future implementations. The
following constants define the various interrupt types in the framework
The following constants define the various interrupt types in the framework
implementation.
#define INTR_TYPE_S_EL1 0
......@@ -103,7 +96,7 @@ implementation.
#define INTR_TYPE_NS 2
#### 1.2.2 Routing model
#### 1.1.2 Routing model
A type of interrupt can be either generated as an FIQ or an IRQ. The target
exception level of an interrupt type is configured through the FIQ and IRQ bits
in the Secure Configuration Register at EL3 (`SCR_EL3.FIQ` and `SCR_EL3.IRQ`
......@@ -122,13 +115,15 @@ routed to EL3. A routing model is applicable only when execution is not in EL3.
The default routing model for an interrupt type is to route it to the FEL in
either security state.
#### 1.2.3 Valid routing models
#### 1.1.3 Valid routing models
The framework considers certain routing models for each type of interrupt to be
incorrect as they conflict with the requirements mentioned in Section 1. The
following sub-sections describe all the possible routing models and specify
which ones are valid or invalid. Only the Secure-EL1 and Non-secure interrupt
types are considered as EL3 interrupts are currently unsupported (See 1.1). The
terminology used in the following sub-sections is explained below.
which ones are valid or invalid. EL3 interrupts are currently supported only
for GIC version 3.0 (ARM GICv3) and only the Secure-EL1 and Non-secure interrupt
types are supported for GIC version 2.0 (ARM GICv2) (See 1.2). The terminology
used in the following sub-sections is explained below.
1. __CSS__. Current Security State. `0` when secure and `1` when non-secure
......@@ -136,7 +131,7 @@ terminology used in the following sub-sections is explained below.
targeted to EL3.
##### 1.2.3.1 Secure-EL1 interrupts
##### 1.1.3.1 Secure-EL1 interrupts
1. __CSS=0, TEL3=0__. Interrupt is routed to the FEL when execution is in
secure state. This is a valid routing model as secure software is in
......@@ -156,13 +151,13 @@ terminology used in the following sub-sections is explained below.
can handover the interrupt to Secure-EL1 for handling.
##### 1.2.3.2 Non-secure interrupts
##### 1.1.3.2 Non-secure interrupts
1. __CSS=0, TEL3=0__. Interrupt is routed to the FEL when execution is in
secure state. This allows the secure software to trap non-secure
interrupts, perform its bookeeping and hand the interrupt to the
interrupts, perform its book-keeping and hand the interrupt to the
non-secure software through EL3. This is a valid routing model as secure
software is in control of how its execution is pre-empted by non-secure
software is in control of how its execution is preempted by non-secure
interrupts.
2. __CSS=0, TEL3=1__. Interrupt is routed to EL3 when execution is in secure
......@@ -182,21 +177,72 @@ terminology used in the following sub-sections is explained below.
non-secure software for handling.
#### 1.2.4 Mapping of interrupt type to signal
##### 1.1.3.3 EL3 interrupts
1. __CSS=0, TEL3=0__. Interrupt is routed to the FEL when execution is in
Secure-EL1/Secure-EL0. This is a valid routing model as secure software
in Secure-EL1/Secure-EL0 is in control of how its execution is preempted
by EL3 interrupt and can handover the interrupt to EL3 for handling.
2. __CSS=0, TEL3=1__. Interrupt is routed to EL3 when execution is in
Secure-EL1/Secure-EL0. This is a valid routing model as secure software
in EL3 can handle the interrupt.
3. __CSS=1, TEL3=0__. Interrupt is routed to the FEL when execution is in
non-secure state. This is an invalid routing model as a secure interrupt
is not visible to the secure software which violates the motivation behind
the ARM Security Extensions.
4. __CSS=1, TEL3=1__. Interrupt is routed to EL3 when execution is in
non-secure state. This is a valid routing model as secure software in EL3
can handle the interrupt.
#### 1.1.4 Mapping of interrupt type to signal
The framework is meant to work with any interrupt controller implemented by a
platform. A interrupt controller could generate a type of interrupt as either an
FIQ or IRQ signal to the CPU depending upon the current security state.The
FIQ or IRQ signal to the CPU depending upon the current security state. The
mapping between the type and signal is known only to the platform. The framework
uses this information to determine whether the IRQ or the FIQ bit should be
programmed in `SCR_EL3` while applying the routing model for a type of
interrupt. The platform provides this information through the
`plat_interrupt_type_to_line()` API (described in the [Porting
Guide]). For example, on the FVP port when the platform uses an ARM GICv2
interrupt controller, Secure-EL1 interrupts are signalled through the FIQ signal
while Non-secure interrupts are signalled through the IRQ signal. This applies
interrupt controller, Secure-EL1 interrupts are signaled through the FIQ signal
while Non-secure interrupts are signaled through the IRQ signal. This applies
when execution is in either security state.
##### 1.1.4.1 Effect of mapping of several interrupt types to one signal
It should be noted that if more than one interrupt type maps to a single
interrupt signal, and if any one of the interrupt type sets __TEL3=1__ for a
particular security state, then interrupt signal will be routed to EL3 when in
that security state. This means that all the other interrupt types using the
same interrupt signal will be forced to the same routing model. This should be
borne in mind when choosing the routing model for an interrupt type.
For example, in ARM GICv3, when the execution context is Secure-EL1/
Secure-EL0, both the EL3 and the non secure interrupt types map to the FIQ
signal. So if either one of the interrupt type sets the routing model so
that __TEL3=1__ when __CSS=0__, the FIQ bit in `SCR_EL3` will be programmed to
route the FIQ signal to EL3 when executing in Secure-EL1/Secure-EL0, thereby
effectively routing the other interrupt type also to EL3.
### 1.2 Assumptions in Interrupt Management Framework
The framework makes the following assumptions to simplify its implementation.
1. Although the framework has support for 2 types of secure interrupts (EL3
and Secure-EL1 interrupt), only interrupt controller architectures
like ARM GICv3 has architectural support for EL3 interrupts in the form of
Group 0 interrupts. In ARM GICv2, all secure interrupts are assumed to be
handled in Secure-EL1. They can be delivered to Secure-EL1 via EL3 but they
cannot be handled in EL3.
2. Interrupt exceptions (`PSTATE.I` and `F` bits) are masked during execution
in EL3.
2. Interrupt management
-----------------------
The following sections describe how interrupts are managed by the interrupt
......@@ -243,9 +289,11 @@ the non-secure interrupts and target them to the primary CPU. It should also
export the interface described in the [Porting Guide] to enable
handling of interrupts.
In the remainder of this document, for the sake of simplicity it is assumed that
the FIQ signal is used to generate Secure-EL1 interrupts and the IRQ signal is
used to generate non-secure interrupts in either security state.
In the remainder of this document, for the sake of simplicity a ARM GICv2 system
is considered and it is assumed that the FIQ signal is used to generate Secure-EL1
interrupts and the IRQ signal is used to generate non-secure interrupts in either
security state. EL3 interrupts are not considered.
### 2.1 Software components
Roles and responsibilities for interrupt management are sub-divided between the
......@@ -256,16 +304,14 @@ briefly described below.
Trusted Firmware.
2. Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD) service. This service interfaces with the
Secure Payload (SP) software which runs in exception levels lower than EL3
i.e. Secure-EL1/Secure-EL0. It is responsible for switching execution
between software running in secure and non-secure states at exception
levels lower than EL3. A switch is triggered by a Secure Monitor Call from
either state. It uses the APIs exported by the Context management library
to implement this functionality. Switching execution between the two
security states is a requirement for interrupt management as well. This
results in a significant dependency on the SPD service. ARM Trusted
firmware implements an example Test Secure Payload Dispatcher (TSPD)
service.
Secure Payload (SP) software which runs in Secure-EL1/Secure-EL0 and is
responsible for switching execution between secure and non-secure states.
A switch is triggered by a Secure Monitor Call and it uses the APIs
exported by the Context management library to implement this functionality.
Switching execution between the two security states is a requirement for
interrupt management as well. This results in a significant dependency on
the SPD service. ARM Trusted firmware implements an example Test Secure
Payload Dispatcher (TSPD) service.
An SPD service plugs into the EL3 runtime firmware and could be common to
some ports of the ARM Trusted Firmware.
......@@ -329,14 +375,13 @@ the type of interrupt.
The `type` parameter can be one of the three interrupt types listed above i.e.
`INTR_TYPE_S_EL1`, `INTR_TYPE_NS` & `INTR_TYPE_EL3` (currently unimplemented).
The `flags` parameter is as described in Section 2.
`INTR_TYPE_S_EL1`, `INTR_TYPE_NS` & `INTR_TYPE_EL3`. The `flags` parameter
is as described in Section 2.
The function will return `0` upon a successful registration. It will return
`-EALREADY` in case a handler for the interrupt type has already been
registered. If the `type` is unrecognised or the `flags` or the `handler` are
invalid it will return `-EINVAL`. It will return `-ENOTSUP` if the specified
`type` is not supported by the framework i.e. `INTR_TYPE_EL3`.
invalid it will return `-EINVAL`.
Interrupt routing is governed by the configuration of the `SCR_EL3.FIQ/IRQ` bits
prior to entry into a lower exception level in either security state. The
......@@ -363,6 +408,7 @@ runtime firmware is responsible for programming the routing model. The SPD is
responsible for ensuring that the routing model has been adhered to upon
receiving an interrupt.
#### 2.2.2 Secure payload dispatcher
A SPD service is responsible for determining and maintaining the interrupt
routing model supported by itself and the Secure Payload. It is also responsible
......@@ -381,6 +427,7 @@ after receiving an interrupt from the EL3 runtime firmware. This information
could either be provided to the SPD service at build time or by the SP at
runtime.
#### 2.2.2.1 Test secure payload dispatcher behavior
The TSPD only handles Secure-EL1 interrupts and is provided with the following
routing model at build time.
......@@ -389,9 +436,16 @@ routing model at build time.
state and are routed to the FEL when execution is in the secure state
i.e __CSS=0, TEL3=0__ & __CSS=1, TEL3=1__ for Secure-EL1 interrupts
* The default routing model is used for non-secure interrupts i.e they are
routed to the FEL in either security state i.e __CSS=0, TEL3=0__ &
__CSS=1, TEL3=0__ for Non-secure interrupts
* When the build flag `TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT` is zero, the default routing
model is used for non-secure interrupts. They are routed to the FEL in
either security state i.e __CSS=0, TEL3=0__ & __CSS=1, TEL3=0__ for
Non-secure interrupts.
* When the build flag `TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT` is defined to 1, then the
non secure interrupts are routed to EL3 when execution is in secure state
i.e __CSS=0, TEL3=1__ for non-secure interrupts. This effectively preempts
Secure-EL1. The default routing model is used for non secure interrupts in
non-secure state. i.e __CSS=1, TEL3=0__.
It performs the following actions in the `tspd_init()` function to fulfill the
requirements mentioned earlier.
......@@ -408,8 +462,8 @@ requirements mentioned earlier.
purpose, SP_EL1/Secure-EL0, LR, VFP and system registers. It can use
`x0-x18` to enable its C runtime.
2. The TSPD implements a handler function for Secure-EL1 interrupts. It
registers it with the EL3 runtime firmware using the
2. The TSPD implements a handler function for Secure-EL1 interrupts. This
function is registered with the EL3 runtime firmware using the
`register_interrupt_type_handler()` API as follows
/* Forward declaration */
......@@ -419,7 +473,24 @@ requirements mentioned earlier.
rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1,
tspd_secure_el1_interrupt_handler,
flags);
assert(rc == 0);
if (rc)
panic();
3. When the build flag `TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT` is defined to 1, the TSPD
implements a handler function for non-secure interrupts. This function is
registered with the EL3 runtime firmware using the
`register_interrupt_type_handler()` API as follows
/* Forward declaration */
interrupt_type_handler tspd_ns_interrupt_handler;
int32_t rc, flags = 0;
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE);
rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_NS,
tspd_ns_interrupt_handler,
flags);
if (rc)
panic();
#### 2.2.3 Secure payload
A Secure Payload must implement an interrupt handling framework at Secure-EL1
......@@ -428,7 +499,7 @@ execution will alternate between the below cases.
1. In the code where IRQ, FIQ or both interrupts are enabled, if an interrupt
type is targeted to the FEL, then it will be routed to the Secure-EL1
exception vector table. This is defined as the asynchronous model of
exception vector table. This is defined as the __asynchronous mode__ of
handling interrupts. This mode applies to both Secure-EL1 and non-secure
interrupts.
......@@ -438,7 +509,7 @@ execution will alternate between the below cases.
in the routing model where __CSS=1 and TEL3=0__. Secure-EL1 interrupts
will be routed to EL3 (as per the routing model where __CSS=1 and
TEL3=1__) where the SPD service will hand them to the SP. This is defined
as the synchronous mode of handling interrupts.
as the __synchronous mode__ of handling interrupts.
The interrupt handling framework implemented by the SP should support one or
both these interrupt handling models depending upon the chosen routing model.
......@@ -449,18 +520,19 @@ the interrupt routing model is not known to the SPD service at compile time,
then the SP should pass this information to the SPD service at runtime during
its initialisation phase.
As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that the FIQ signal is used to generate
Secure-EL1 interrupts and the IRQ signal is used to generate non-secure
interrupts in either security state.
As mentioned earlier, a ARM GICv2 system is considered and it is assumed that
the FIQ signal is used to generate Secure-EL1 interrupts and the IRQ signal
is used to generate non-secure interrupts in either security state.
##### 2.2.3.1 Secure payload IHF design w.r.t secure-EL1 interrupts
1. __CSS=0, TEL3=0__. If `PSTATE.F=0`, Secure-EL1 interrupts will be
trigerred at one of the Secure-EL1 FIQ exception vectors. The Secure-EL1
triggered at one of the Secure-EL1 FIQ exception vectors. The Secure-EL1
IHF should implement support for handling FIQ interrupts asynchronously.
If `PSTATE.F=1` then Secure-EL1 interrupts will be handled as per the
synchronous interrupt handling model. The SP could implement this scenario
by exporting a seperate entrypoint for Secure-EL1 interrupts to the SPD
by exporting a separate entrypoint for Secure-EL1 interrupts to the SPD
service during the registration phase. The SPD service would also need to
know the state of the system, general purpose and the `PSTATE` registers
in which it should arrange to return execution to the SP. The SP should
......@@ -471,21 +543,21 @@ interrupts in either security state.
non-secure state. They should be handled through the synchronous interrupt
handling model as described in 1. above.
3. __CSS=0, TEL3=1__. Secure interrupts are routed to EL3 when execution is in
secure state. They will not be visible to the SP. The `PSTATE.F` bit in
Secure-EL1/Secure-EL0 will not mask FIQs. The EL3 runtime firmware will
call the handler registered by the SPD service for Secure-EL1
interrupts. Secure-EL1 IHF should then handle all Secure-EL1 interrupt
through the synchronous interrupt handling model described in 1. above.
3. __CSS=0, TEL3=1__. Secure-EL1 interrupts are routed to EL3 when execution
is in secure state. They will not be visible to the SP. The `PSTATE.F` bit
in Secure-EL1/Secure-EL0 will not mask FIQs. The EL3 runtime firmware will
call the handler registered by the SPD service for Secure-EL1 interrupts.
Secure-EL1 IHF should then handle all Secure-EL1 interrupt through the
synchronous interrupt handling model described in 1. above.
##### 2.2.3.2 Secure payload IHF design w.r.t non-secure interrupts
1. __CSS=0, TEL3=0__. If `PSTATE.I=0`, non-secure interrupts will be
trigerred at one of the Secure-EL1 IRQ exception vectors . The Secure-EL1
triggered at one of the Secure-EL1 IRQ exception vectors . The Secure-EL1
IHF should co-ordinate with the SPD service to transfer execution to the
non-secure state where the interrupt should be handled e.g the SP could
allocate a function identifier to issue a SMC64 or SMC32 to the SPD
service which indicates that the SP execution has been pre-empted by a
service which indicates that the SP execution has been preempted by a
non-secure interrupt. If this function identifier is not known to the SPD
service at compile time then the SP could provide it during the
registration phase.
......@@ -504,12 +576,12 @@ interrupts in either security state.
non-secure state (EL1/EL2) and are not visible to the SP. This routing
model does not affect the SP behavior.
A Secure Payload must also ensure that all Secure-EL1 interrupts are correctly
configured at the interrupt controller by the platform port of the EL3 runtime
firmware. It should configure any additional Secure-EL1 interrupts which the EL3
runtime firmware is not aware of through its platform port.
#### 2.2.3.3 Test secure payload behavior
The routing model for Secure-EL1 and non-secure interrupts chosen by the TSP is
described in Section 2.2.2. It is known to the TSPD service at build time.
......@@ -534,6 +606,7 @@ interrupt management across all the software components listed in 2.1
This section describes in detail the role of each software component (see
Section 2.1) in handling an interrupt of a particular type.
#### 2.3.1 EL3 runtime firmware
The EL3 runtime firmware populates the IRQ and FIQ exception vectors referenced
by the `runtime_exceptions` variable as follows.
......@@ -560,8 +633,8 @@ responsible for:
from the per-cpu `cpu_context` data structure in `SP_EL0` and
executing the `msr spsel, #0` instruction.
4. Determining the type of interrupt. Secure-EL1 interrupts will be signalled
at the FIQ vector. Non-secure interrupts will be signalled at the IRQ
4. Determining the type of interrupt. Secure-EL1 interrupts will be signaled
at the FIQ vector. Non-secure interrupts will be signaled at the IRQ
vector. The platform should implement the following API to determine the
type of the pending interrupt.
......@@ -604,46 +677,25 @@ for the following:
1. Validating the interrupt. This involves ensuring that the interrupt was
generating according to the interrupt routing model specified by the SPD
service during registration. It should use the interrupt id and the
security state of the exception level (passed in the `flags` parameter of
the handler) where the interrupt was taken from to determine this. If the
interrupt is not recognised then the handler should treat it as an
irrecoverable error condition.
service during registration. It should use the security state of the
exception level (passed in the `flags` parameter of the handler) where
the interrupt was taken from to determine this. If the interrupt is not
recognised then the handler should treat it as an irrecoverable error
condition.
A SPD service can register a handler for Secure-EL1 and/or Non-secure
interrupts. The following text describes further error scenarios keeping
this in mind:
1. __SPD service has registered a handler for Non-secure interrupts__:
When an interrupt is received by the handler, it could check its id
to ensure it has been configured as a non-secure interrupt at the
interrupt controller. A secure interrupt should never be handed to
the non-secure interrupt handler. A non-secure interrupt should
never be routed to EL3 when execution is in non-secure state. The
handler could check the security state flag to ensure this.
2. __SPD service has registered a handler for Secure-EL1 interrupts__:
When an interrupt is received by the handler, it could check its id
to ensure it has been configured as a secure interrupt at the
interrupt controller. A non-secure interrupt should never be handed
to the secure interrupt handler. A routing model could be chosen
where Secure-EL1 interrupts are routed to S-EL1 instead of EL3 when
execution is in secure state. If the handler receives a Secure-EL1
interrupt it should check which security state has the interrupt
originated from. A Secure-EL1 interrupt generated when execution is in
secure state would be invalid in this routing model. The handler could
use the security state flag to check this.
The SPD service should use the platform API:
`plat_ic_get_interrupt_type()` to determine the type of interrupt for the
specified id.
2. Determining whether the security state of the exception level for handling
the interrupt is the same as the security state of the exception level
where the interrupt was generated. This depends upon the routing model and
type of the interrupt. The SPD should use this information to determine if
a context switch is required. The following two cases would require a
context switch from secure to non-secure or vice-versa.
interrupts. A non-secure interrupt should never be routed to EL3 from
from non-secure state. Also if a routing model is chosen where Secure-EL1
interrupts are routed to S-EL1 when execution is in Secure state, then a
S-EL1 interrupt should never be routed to EL3 from secure state. The handler
could use the security state flag to check this.
2. Determining whether a context switch is required. This depends upon the
routing model and interrupt type. For non secure and S-EL1 interrupt,
if the security state of the execution context where the interrupt was
generated is not the same as the security state required for handling
the interrupt, a context switch is required. The following 2 cases
require a context switch from secure to non-secure or vice-versa:
1. A Secure-EL1 interrupt taken from the non-secure state should be
routed to the Secure Payload.
......@@ -661,21 +713,21 @@ for the following:
per the synchronous interrupt handling model it implements. A Secure-EL1
interrupt can be routed to EL3 while execution is in the SP. This implies
that SP execution can be preempted while handling an interrupt by a
another higher priority Secure-EL1 interrupt (or a EL3 interrupt in the
future). The SPD service should manage secure interrupt priorities before
handing control to the SP to prevent this type of preemption which can
leave the system in an inconsistent state.
another higher priority Secure-EL1 interrupt or a EL3 interrupt. The SPD
service should be able to handle this preemption or manage secure interrupt
priorities before handing control to the SP.
3. Setting the return value of the handler to the per-cpu `cpu_context` if
the interrupt has been successfully validated and ready to be handled at a
lower exception level.
The routing model allows non-secure interrupts to be taken to Secure-EL1 when in
secure state. The SPD service and the SP should implement a mechanism for
routing these interrupts to the last known exception level in the non-secure
state. The former should save the SP context, restore the non-secure context and
arrange for entry into the non-secure state so that the interrupt can be
handled.
The routing model allows non-secure interrupts to interrupt Secure-EL1 when in
secure state if it has been configured to do so. The SPD service and the SP
should implement a mechanism for routing these interrupts to the last known
exception level in the non-secure state. The former should save the SP context,
restore the non-secure context and arrange for entry into the non-secure state
so that the interrupt can be handled.
##### 2.3.2.2 Interrupt exit
When the Secure Payload has finished handling a Secure-EL1 interrupt, it could
......@@ -684,35 +736,38 @@ should handle this secure monitor call so that execution resumes in the
exception level and the security state from where the Secure-EL1 interrupt was
originally taken.
##### 2.3.2.3 Test secure payload dispatcher behavior
The example TSPD service registers a handler for Secure-EL1 interrupts taken
from the non-secure state. Its handler `tspd_secure_el1_interrupt_handler()`
takes the following actions upon being invoked.
1. It uses the `id` parameter to query the interrupt controller to ensure
that the interrupt is a Secure-EL1 interrupt. It asserts if this is not
the case.
##### 2.3.2.3 Test secure payload dispatcher Secure-EL1 interrupt handling
The example TSPD service registers a handler for Secure-EL1 interrupts taken
from the non-secure state. During execution in S-EL1, the TSPD expects that the
Secure-EL1 interrupts are handled in S-EL1 by TSP. Its handler
`tspd_secure_el1_interrupt_handler()` expects only to be invoked for Secure-EL1
originating from the non-secure state. It takes the following actions upon being
invoked.
2. It uses the security state provided in the `flags` parameter to ensure
1. It uses the security state provided in the `flags` parameter to ensure
that the secure interrupt originated from the non-secure state. It asserts
if this is not the case.
3. It saves the system register context for the non-secure state by calling
2. It saves the system register context for the non-secure state by calling
`cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);`.
4. It sets the `ELR_EL3` system register to `tsp_sel1_intr_entry` and sets the
3. It sets the `ELR_EL3` system register to `tsp_sel1_intr_entry` and sets the
`SPSR_EL3.DAIF` bits in the secure CPU context. It sets `x0` to
`TSP_HANDLE_SEL1_INTR_AND_RETURN`. If the TSP was in the middle of handling a
standard SMC, then the `ELR_EL3` and `SPSR_EL3` registers in the secure CPU
context are saved first.
5. It restores the system register context for the secure state by calling
`TSP_HANDLE_SEL1_INTR_AND_RETURN`. If the TSP was preempted earlier by a non
secure interrupt during `standard` SMC processing, save the registers that
will be trashed, which is the `ELR_EL3` and `SPSR_EL3`, in order to be able
to re-enter TSP for Secure-EL1 interrupt processing. It does not need to
save any other secure context since the TSP is expected to preserve it
(see Section 2.2.2.1).
4. It restores the system register context for the secure state by calling
`cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);`.
6. It ensures that the secure CPU context is used to program the next
5. It ensures that the secure CPU context is used to program the next
exception return from EL3 by calling `cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);`.
7. It returns the per-cpu `cpu_context` to indicate that the interrupt can
6. It returns the per-cpu `cpu_context` to indicate that the interrupt can
now be handled by the SP. `x1` is written with the value of `elr_el3`
register for the non-secure state. This information is used by the SP for
debugging purposes.
......@@ -726,44 +781,83 @@ state.
The TSP issues an SMC with `TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_INTR` as the function identifier to
signal completion of interrupt handling.
The TSP issues an SMC with `TSP_PREEMPTED` as the function identifier to signal
generation of a non-secure interrupt in Secure-EL1.
The TSPD service takes the following actions in `tspd_smc_handler()` function
upon receiving an SMC with `TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_INTR` and `TSP_PREEMPTED` as the
function identifiers:
upon receiving an SMC with `TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_INTR` as the function identifier:
1. It ensures that the call originated from the secure state otherwise
execution returns to the non-secure state with `SMC_UNK` in `x0`.
2. If the function identifier is `TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_INTR`, it restores the
saved `ELR_EL3` and `SPSR_EL3` system registers back to the secure CPU
context (see step 4 above) in case the TSP had been preempted by a non
secure interrupt earlier. It does not save the secure context since the
TSP is expected to preserve it (see Section 2.2.2.1)
2. It restores the saved `ELR_EL3` and `SPSR_EL3` system registers back to
the secure CPU context (see step 3 above) in case the TSP had been preempted
by a non secure interrupt earlier.
3. It restores the system register context for the non-secure state by
calling `cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE)`.
4. It ensures that the non-secure CPU context is used to program the next
exception return from EL3 by calling `cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE)`.
5. `tspd_smc_handler()` returns a reference to the non-secure `cpu_context`
as the return value.
3. If the function identifier is `TSP_PREEMPTED`, it saves the system
register context for the secure state by calling
##### 2.3.2.4 Test secure payload dispatcher non-secure interrupt handling
The TSP in Secure-EL1 can be preempted by a non-secure interrupt during
`standard` SMC processing or by a higher priority EL3 interrupt during
Secure-EL1 interrupt processing. Currently only non-secure interrupts can
cause preemption of TSP since there are no EL3 interrupts in the
system.
It should be noted that while TSP is preempted, the TSPD only allows entry into
the TSP either for Secure-EL1 interrupt handling or for resuming the preempted
`standard` SMC in response to the `TSP_FID_RESUME` SMC from the normal world.
(See Section 3).
The non-secure interrupt triggered in Secure-EL1 during `standard` SMC processing
can be routed to either EL3 or Secure-EL1 and is controlled by build option
`TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT` (see Section 2.2.2.1). If the build option is set,
the TSPD will set the routing model for the non-secure interrupt to be routed to
EL3 from secure state i.e. __TEL3=1, CSS=0__ and registers
`tspd_ns_interrupt_handler()` as the non-secure interrupt handler. The
`tspd_ns_interrupt_handler()` on being invoked ensures that the interrupt
originated from the secure state and disables routing of non-secure interrupts
from secure state to EL3. This is to prevent further preemption (by a non-secure
interrupt) when TSP is reentered for handling Secure-EL1 interrupts that
triggered while execution was in the normal world. The
`tspd_ns_interrupt_handler()` then invokes `tspd_handle_sp_preemption()` for
further handling.
If the `TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT` build option is zero (default), the default
routing model for non-secure interrupt in secure state is in effect
i.e. __TEL3=0, CSS=0__. During `standard` SMC processing, the IRQ
exceptions are unmasked i.e. `PSTATE.I=0`, and a non-secure interrupt will
trigger at Secure-EL1 IRQ exception vector. The TSP saves the general purpose
register context and issues an SMC with `TSP_PREEMPTED` as the function
identifier to signal preemption of TSP. The TSPD SMC handler,
`tspd_smc_handler()`, ensures that the SMC call originated from the
secure state otherwise execution returns to the non-secure state with
`SMC_UNK` in `x0`. It then invokes `tspd_handle_sp_preemption()` for
further handling.
The `tspd_handle_sp_preemption()` takes the following actions upon being
invoked:
1. It saves the system register context for the secure state by calling
`cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE)`.
4. It restores the system register context for the non-secure state by
calling `cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE)`. It sets `x0` to
`SMC_PREEMPTED` if the incoming function identifier is
`TSP_PREEMPTED`. The Normal World is expected to resume the TSP after the
non-secure interrupt handling by issuing an SMC with `TSP_FID_RESUME` as
the function identifier.
2. It restores the system register context for the non-secure state by
calling `cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE)`.
5. It ensures that the non-secure CPU context is used to program the next
exception return from EL3 by calling
`cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE)`.
3. It ensures that the non-secure CPU context is used to program the next
exception return from EL3 by calling `cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE)`.
6. `tspd_smc_handler()` returns a reference to the non-secure `cpu_context`
as the return value.
4. `SMC_PREEMPTED` is set in x0 and return to non secure state after
restoring non secure context.
As mentioned in 4. above, if a non-secure interrupt preempts the TSP execution
then the non-secure software issues an SMC with `TSP_FID_RESUME` as the function
identifier to resume TSP execution. The TSPD service takes the following actions
in `tspd_smc_handler()` function upon receiving this SMC:
The Normal World is expected to resume the TSP after the `standard` SMC preemption
by issuing an SMC with `TSP_FID_RESUME` as the function identifier (see section 3).
The TSPD service takes the following actions in `tspd_smc_handler()` function
upon receiving this SMC:
1. It ensures that the call originated from the non secure state. An
assertion is raised otherwise.
......@@ -782,7 +876,8 @@ in `tspd_smc_handler()` function upon receiving this SMC:
return value.
The figure below describes how the TSP/TSPD handle a non-secure interrupt when
it is generated during execution in the TSP with `PSTATE.I` = 0.
it is generated during execution in the TSP with `PSTATE.I` = 0 when the
`TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT` build flag is 0.
![Image 2](diagrams/non-sec-int-handling.png?raw=true)
......@@ -809,18 +904,22 @@ service to pass control back to the non-secure state in the last known exception
level. This will allow the non-secure interrupt to be handled in the non-secure
state.
##### 2.3.3.1 Test secure payload behavior
The TSPD hands control of a Secure-EL1 interrupt to the TSP at the
`tsp_sel1_intr_entry()`. The TSP handles the interrupt while ensuring that the
handover agreement described in Section 2.2.2.1 is maintained. It updates some
statistics by calling `tsp_update_sync_fiq_stats()`. It then calls
`tsp_fiq_handler()` which.
statistics by calling `tsp_update_sync_sel1_intr_stats()`. It then calls
`tsp_common_int_handler()` which.
1. Checks whether the interrupt is the secure physical timer interrupt. It
uses the platform API `plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_id()` to get the
interrupt number.
interrupt number. If it is not the secure physical timer interrupt, then
that means that a higher priority interrupt has preempted it. Invoke
`tsp_handle_preemption()` to handover control back to EL3 by issuing
an SMC with `TSP_PREEMPTED` as the function identifier.
2. Handles the interrupt by acknowledging it using the
2. Handles the secure timer interrupt interrupt by acknowledging it using the
`plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt()` platform API, calling
`tsp_generic_timer_handler()` to reprogram the secure physical generic
timer and calling the `plat_ic_end_of_interrupt()` platform API to signal
......@@ -831,17 +930,62 @@ The TSP passes control back to the TSPD by issuing an SMC64 with
The TSP handles interrupts under the asynchronous model as follows.
1. Secure-EL1 interrupts are handled by calling the `tsp_fiq_handler()`
1. Secure-EL1 interrupts are handled by calling the `tsp_common_int_handler()`
function. The function has been described above.
2. Non-secure interrupts are handled by issuing an SMC64 with `TSP_PREEMPTED`
as the function identifier. Execution resumes at the instruction that
follows this SMC instruction when the TSPD hands control to the TSP in
response to an SMC with `TSP_FID_RESUME` as the function identifier from
the non-secure state (see section 2.3.2.1).
2. Non-secure interrupts are handled by by calling the `tsp_common_int_handler()`
function which ends up invoking `tsp_handle_preemption()` and issuing an
SMC64 with `TSP_PREEMPTED` as the function identifier. Execution resumes at
the instruction that follows this SMC instruction when the TSPD hands
control to the TSP in response to an SMC with `TSP_FID_RESUME` as the
function identifier from the non-secure state (see section 2.3.2.4).
3. Other considerations
-----------------------
### 3.1 Implication of preempted SMC on Non-Secure Software
A `standard` SMC call to Secure payload can be preempted by a non-secure
interrupt and the execution can return to the non-secure world for handling
the interrupt (For details on `standard` SMC refer [SMC calling convention]).
In this case, the SMC call has not completed its execution and the execution
must return back to the secure payload to resume the preempted SMC call.
This can be achieved by issuing an SMC call which instructs to resume the
preempted SMC.
A `fast` SMC cannot be preempted and hence this case will not happen for
a fast SMC call.
In the Test Secure Payload implementation, `TSP_FID_RESUME` is designated
as the resume SMC FID. It is important to note that `TSP_FID_RESUME` is a
`standard` SMC which means it too can be be preempted. The typical non
secure software sequence for issuing a `standard` SMC would look like this,
assuming `P.STATE.I=0` in the non secure state :
int rc;
rc = smc(TSP_STD_SMC_FID, ...); /* Issue a Standard SMC call */
/* The pending non-secure interrupt is handled by the interrupt handler
and returns back here. */
while (rc == SMC_PREEMPTED) { /* Check if the SMC call is preempted */
rc = smc(TSP_FID_RESUME); /* Issue resume SMC call */
}
The `TSP_STD_SMC_FID` is any `standard` SMC function identifier and the smc()
function invokes a SMC call with the required arguments. The pending non-secure
interrupt causes an IRQ exception and the IRQ handler registered at the
exception vector handles the non-secure interrupt and returns. The return value
from the SMC call is tested for `SMC_PREEMPTED` to check whether it is
preempted. If it is, then the resume SMC call `TSP_FID_RESUME` is issued. The
return value of the SMC call is tested again to check if it is preempted.
This is done in a loop till the SMC call succeeds or fails. If a `standard`
SMC is preempted, until it is resumed using `TSP_FID_RESUME` SMC and
completed, the current TSPD prevents any other SMC call from re-entering
TSP by returning `SMC_UNK` error.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
_Copyright (c) 2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved._
_Copyright (c) 2014-2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved._
[Porting Guide]: ./porting-guide.md
[SMC calling convention]: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0028a/index.html "SMC Calling Convention PDD (ARM DEN 0028A)"
docs/porting-guide.md
View file @ 81123e82
......@@ -1451,9 +1451,12 @@ described in the [IMF Design Guide]
A platform should export the following APIs to support the IMF. The following
text briefly describes each api and its implementation in ARM standard
platforms. The API implementation depends upon the type of interrupt controller
present in the platform. ARM standard platforms implements an ARM Generic
Interrupt Controller (ARM GIC) as per the version 2.0 of the
[ARM GIC Architecture Specification].
present in the platform. ARM standard platform layer supports both [ARM Generic
Interrupt Controller version 2.0 (GICv2)][ARM GIC Architecture Specification 2.0]
and [3.0 (GICv3)][ARM GIC Architecture Specification 3.0]. Juno builds the ARM
Standard layer to use GICv2 and the FVP can be configured to use either GICv2 or
GICv3 depending on the build flag `FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER` (See FVP platform
specific build options in [User Guide] for more details).
### Function : plat_interrupt_type_to_line() [mandatory]
......@@ -1465,7 +1468,7 @@ interrupt line. The specific line that is signaled depends on how the interrupt
controller (IC) reports different interrupt types from an execution context in
either security state. The IMF uses this API to determine which interrupt line
the platform IC uses to signal each type of interrupt supported by the framework
from a given security state.
from a given security state. This API must be invoked at EL3.
The first parameter will be one of the `INTR_TYPE_*` values (see [IMF Design
Guide]) indicating the target type of the interrupt, the second parameter is the
......@@ -1473,8 +1476,19 @@ security state of the originating execution context. The return result is the
bit position in the `SCR_EL3` register of the respective interrupt trap: IRQ=1,
FIQ=2.
ARM standard platforms configure the ARM GIC to signal S-EL1 interrupts
as FIQs and Non-secure interrupts as IRQs from either security state.
In the case of ARM standard platforms using GICv2, S-EL1 interrupts are
configured as FIQs and Non-secure interrupts as IRQs from either security
state.
In the case of ARM standard platforms using GICv3, the interrupt line to be
configured depends on the security state of the execution context when the
interrupt is signalled and are as follows:
* The S-EL1 interrupts are signaled as IRQ in S-EL0/1 context and as FIQ in
NS-EL0/1/2 context.
* The Non secure interrupts are signaled as FIQ in S-EL0/1 context and as IRQ
in the NS-EL0/1/2 context.
* The EL3 interrupts are signaled as FIQ in both S-EL0/1 and NS-EL0/1/2
context.
### Function : plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_type() [mandatory]
......@@ -1486,16 +1500,27 @@ This API returns the type of the highest priority pending interrupt at the
platform IC. The IMF uses the interrupt type to retrieve the corresponding
handler function. `INTR_TYPE_INVAL` is returned when there is no interrupt
pending. The valid interrupt types that can be returned are `INTR_TYPE_EL3`,
`INTR_TYPE_S_EL1` and `INTR_TYPE_NS`.
`INTR_TYPE_S_EL1` and `INTR_TYPE_NS`. This API must be invoked at EL3.
ARM standard platforms read the _Highest Priority Pending Interrupt
Register_ (`GICC_HPPIR`) to determine the id of the pending interrupt. The type
of interrupt depends upon the id value as follows.
In the case of ARM standard platforms using GICv2, the _Highest Priority
Pending Interrupt Register_ (`GICC_HPPIR`) is read to determine the id of
the pending interrupt. The type of interrupt depends upon the id value as
follows.
1. id < 1022 is reported as a S-EL1 interrupt
2. id = 1022 is reported as a Non-secure interrupt.
3. id = 1023 is reported as an invalid interrupt type.
In the case of ARM standard platforms using GICv3, the system register
`ICC_HPPIR0_EL1`, _Highest Priority Pending group 0 Interrupt Register_,
is read to determine the id of the pending interrupt. The type of interrupt
depends upon the id value as follows.
1. id = `PENDING_G1S_INTID` (1020) is reported as a S-EL1 interrupt
2. id = `PENDING_G1NS_INTID` (1021) is reported as a Non-secure interrupt.
3. id = `GIC_SPURIOUS_INTERRUPT` (1023) is reported as an invalid interrupt type.
4. All other interrupt id's are reported as EL3 interrupt.
### Function : plat_ic_get_pending_interrupt_id() [mandatory]
......@@ -1506,17 +1531,35 @@ This API returns the id of the highest priority pending interrupt at the
platform IC. INTR_ID_UNAVAILABLE is returned when there is no interrupt
pending.
ARM standard platforms read the _Highest Priority Pending Interrupt
Register_ (`GICC_HPPIR`) to determine the id of the pending interrupt. The id
that is returned by API depends upon the value of the id read from the interrupt
controller as follows.
In the case of ARM standard platforms using GICv2, the _Highest Priority
Pending Interrupt Register_ (`GICC_HPPIR`) is read to determine the id of the
pending interrupt. The id that is returned by API depends upon the value of
the id read from the interrupt controller as follows.
1. id < 1022. id is returned as is.
2. id = 1022. The _Aliased Highest Priority Pending Interrupt Register_
(`GICC_AHPPIR`) is read to determine the id of the non-secure interrupt. This
id is returned by the API.
(`GICC_AHPPIR`) is read to determine the id of the non-secure interrupt.
This id is returned by the API.
3. id = 1023. `INTR_ID_UNAVAILABLE` is returned.
In the case of ARM standard platforms using GICv3, if the API is invoked from
EL3, the system register `ICC_HPPIR0_EL1`, _Highest Priority Pending Interrupt
group 0 Register_, is read to determine the id of the pending interrupt. The id
that is returned by API depends upon the value of the id read from the
interrupt controller as follows.
1. id < `PENDING_G1S_INTID` (1020). id is returned as is.
2. id = `PENDING_G1S_INTID` (1020) or `PENDING_G1NS_INTID` (1021). The system
register `ICC_HPPIR1_EL1`, _Highest Priority Pending Interrupt group 1
Register_ is read to determine the id of the group 1 interrupt. This id
is returned by the API as long as it is a valid interrupt id
3. If the id is any of the special interrupt identifiers,
`INTR_ID_UNAVAILABLE` is returned.
When the API invoked from S-EL1 for GICv3 systems, the id read from system
register `ICC_HPPIR1_EL1`, _Highest Priority Pending group 1 Interrupt
Register_, is returned if is not equal to GIC_SPURIOUS_INTERRUPT (1023) else
`INTR_ID_UNAVAILABLE` is returned.
### Function : plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt() [mandatory]
......@@ -1527,11 +1570,19 @@ This API is used by the CPU to indicate to the platform IC that processing of
the highest pending interrupt has begun. It should return the id of the
interrupt which is being processed.
This function in ARM standard platforms reads the _Interrupt Acknowledge
Register_ (`GICC_IAR`). This changes the state of the highest priority pending
interrupt from pending to active in the interrupt controller. It returns the
value read from the `GICC_IAR`. This value is the id of the interrupt whose
state has been changed.
This function in ARM standard platforms using GICv2, reads the _Interrupt
Acknowledge Register_ (`GICC_IAR`). This changes the state of the highest
priority pending interrupt from pending to active in the interrupt controller.
It returns the value read from the `GICC_IAR`. This value is the id of the
interrupt whose state has been changed.
In the case of ARM standard platforms using GICv3, if the API is invoked
from EL3, the function reads the system register `ICC_IAR0_EL1`, _Interrupt
Acknowledge Register group 0_. If the API is invoked from S-EL1, the function
reads the system register `ICC_IAR1_EL1`, _Interrupt Acknowledge Register
group 1_. The read changes the state of the highest pending interrupt from
pending to active in the interrupt controller. The value read is returned
and is the id of the interrupt whose state has been changed.
The TSP uses this API to start processing of the secure physical timer
interrupt.
......@@ -1548,7 +1599,9 @@ finished. The id should be the same as the id returned by the
`plat_ic_acknowledge_interrupt()` API.
ARM standard platforms write the id to the _End of Interrupt Register_
(`GICC_EOIR`). This deactivates the corresponding interrupt in the interrupt
(`GICC_EOIR`) in case of GICv2, and to `ICC_EOIR0_EL1` or `ICC_EOIR1_EL1`
system register in case of GICv3 depending on where the API is invoked from,
EL3 or S-EL1. This deactivates the corresponding interrupt in the interrupt
controller.
The TSP uses this API to finish processing of the secure physical timer
......@@ -1564,13 +1617,17 @@ This API returns the type of the interrupt id passed as the parameter.
`INTR_TYPE_INVAL` is returned if the id is invalid. If the id is valid, a valid
interrupt type (one of `INTR_TYPE_EL3`, `INTR_TYPE_S_EL1` and `INTR_TYPE_NS`) is
returned depending upon how the interrupt has been configured by the platform
IC.
IC. This API must be invoked at EL3.
ARM standard platforms using GICv2 configures S-EL1 interrupts as Group0 interrupts
and Non-secure interrupts as Group1 interrupts. It reads the group value
corresponding to the interrupt id from the relevant _Interrupt Group Register_
(`GICD_IGROUPRn`). It uses the group value to determine the type of interrupt.
This function in ARM standard platforms configures S-EL1 interrupts
as Group0 interrupts and Non-secure interrupts as Group1 interrupts. It reads
the group value corresponding to the interrupt id from the relevant _Interrupt
Group Register_ (`GICD_IGROUPRn`). It uses the group value to determine the
type of interrupt.
In the case of ARM standard platforms using GICv3, both the _Interrupt Group
Register_ (`GICD_IGROUPRn`) and _Interrupt Group Modifier Register_
(`GICD_IGRPMODRn`) is read to figure out whether the interrupt is configured
as Group 0 secure interrupt, Group 1 secure interrupt or Group 1 NS interrupt.
3.5 Crash Reporting mechanism (in BL31)
......@@ -1716,7 +1773,8 @@ amount of open resources per driver.
_Copyright (c) 2013-2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved._
[ARM GIC Architecture Specification]: http://arminfo.emea.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ihi0048b/IHI0048B_gic_architecture_specification.pdf
[ARM GIC Architecture Specification 2.0]: http://arminfo.emea.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ihi0048b/IHI0048B_gic_architecture_specification.pdf
[ARM GIC Architecture Specification 3.0]: http://arminfo.emea.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.ihi0069a/IHI0069A_gic_architecture_specification.pdf
[IMF Design Guide]: interrupt-framework-design.md
[User Guide]: user-guide.md
[FreeBSD]: http://www.freebsd.org
......
docs/user-guide.md
View file @ 81123e82
......@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ Contents :
8. [Preparing the images to run on FVP](#8--preparing-the-images-to-run-on-fvp)
9. [Running the software on FVP](#9--running-the-software-on-fvp)
10. [Running the software on Juno](#10--running-the-software-on-juno)
11. [Changes required for booting Linux on FVP in GICv3 mode](#11--changes-required-for-booting-linux-on-fvp-in-gicv3-mode)
1. Introduction
......@@ -62,9 +63,14 @@ normal world firmware, Linux kernel and device tree, file system as well as any
additional micro-controller firmware required by the platform. This version of
Trusted Firmware is tested with the [Linaro 15.10 Release][Linaro Release Notes].
Note: Both the LSK kernel or the latest tracking kernel can be used along the
Note 1: Both the LSK kernel or the latest tracking kernel can be used with the
ARM Trusted Firmware, choose the one that best suits your needs.
Note 2: Currently to run the latest tracking kernel on FVP with GICv3 driver,
some modifications are required to UEFI. Refer
[here](#11--changes-required-for-booting-linux-on-fvp-in-gicv3-mode)
for more details.
The Trusted Firmware source code can then be found in the `arm-tf/` directory.
This is the full git repository cloned from Github. The revision checked out by
the `repo` tool is indicated by the manifest file. Depending on the manifest
......@@ -238,9 +244,10 @@ performed.
* `V`: Verbose build. If assigned anything other than 0, the build commands
are printed. Default is 0.
* `ARM_GIC_ARCH`: Choice of ARM GIC architecture version used by the ARM GIC
driver for implementing the platform GIC API. This API is used
* `ARM_GIC_ARCH`: Choice of ARM GIC architecture version used by the ARM
Legacy GIC driver for implementing the platform GIC API. This API is used
by the interrupt management framework. Default is 2 (that is, version 2.0).
This build option is deprecated.
* `ARM_CCI_PRODUCT_ID`: Choice of ARM CCI product used by the platform. This
is used to determine the number of valid slave interfaces available in the
......@@ -444,6 +451,16 @@ map is explained in the [Firmware Design].
set to 1 then Trusted Firmware will detect if an earlier version is in use.
Default is 1.
#### ARM FVP platform specific build options
* `FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER` : Selects the GIC driver to be built. Options:
- `FVP_GICV2` : The GICv2 only driver is selected
- `FVP_GICV3` : The GICv3 only driver is selected (default option)
- `FVP_GICV3_LEGACY`: The Legacy GICv3 driver is selected (deprecated).
Note that if the FVP is configured for legacy VE memory map, then ARM
Trusted Firmware must be compiled with GICv2 only driver using
`FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER=FVP_GICV2` build option.
### Creating a Firmware Image Package
......@@ -1096,8 +1113,9 @@ registers memory map (`0x1c010000`).
This register can be configured as described in the following sections.
NOTE: If the legacy VE GIC memory map is used, then the corresponding FDT and
BL33 images should be used.
NOTE: If the legacy VE GIC memory map is used, then Trusted Firmware must be
compiled with the GICv2 only driver, and the corresponding FDT and BL33 images
should be used.
#### Configuring AEMv8 Foundation FVP GIC for legacy VE memory map
......@@ -1255,6 +1273,23 @@ following command:
The Juno board should suspend to RAM and then wakeup after 10 seconds due to
wakeup interrupt from RTC.
11. Changes required for booting Linux on FVP in GICv3 mode
------------------------------------------------------------
In case the TF FVP port is built with the build option
`FVP_USE_GIC_DRIVER=FVP_GICV3`, then the GICv3 hardware cannot be used in
GICv2 legacy mode. The default build of UEFI for FVP in
[latest tracking kernel][Linaro Release Notes] configures GICv3 in GICv2 legacy
mode. This can be changed by setting the build flag
`gArmTokenSpaceGuid.PcdArmGicV3WithV2Legacy` to FALSE in
`uefi/edk2/ArmPlatformPkg/ArmVExpressPkg/ArmVExpress-FVP-AArch64.dsc`.
Recompile UEFI as mentioned [here][FVP Instructions].
The GICv3 DTBs found in ARM Trusted Firmware source directory can be
used to test the GICv3 kernel on the respective FVP models.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
_Copyright (c) 2013-2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved._
......@@ -1266,6 +1301,7 @@ _Copyright (c) 2013-2015, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved._
[ARM Platforms Portal]: https://community.arm.com/groups/arm-development-platforms
[Linaro SW Instructions]: https://community.arm.com/docs/DOC-10803
[Juno Instructions]: https://community.arm.com/docs/DOC-10804
[FVP Instructions]: https://community.arm.com/docs/DOC-10831
[Juno Getting Started Guide]: http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.dui0928e/DUI0928E_juno_arm_development_platform_gsg.pdf
[DS-5]: http://www.arm.com/products/tools/software-tools/ds-5/index.php
[mbed TLS Repository]: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls.git
......
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