Implement static workaround for CVE-2018-3639
For affected CPUs, this approach enables the mitigation during EL3 initialization, following every PE reset. No mechanism is provided to disable the mitigation at runtime. This approach permanently mitigates the entire software stack and no additional mitigation code is required in other software components. TF-A implements this approach for the following affected CPUs: * Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72, by setting bit 55 (Disable load pass store) of `CPUACTLR_EL1` (`S3_1_C15_C2_0`). * Cortex-A73, by setting bit 3 of `S3_0_C15_C0_0` (not documented in the Technical Reference Manual (TRM)). * Cortex-A75, by setting bit 35 (reserved in TRM) of `CPUACTLR_EL1` (`S3_0_C15_C1_0`). Additionally, a new SMC interface is implemented to allow software executing in lower ELs to discover whether the system is mitigated against CVE-2018-3639. Refer to "Firmware interfaces for mitigating cache speculation vulnerabilities System Software on Arm Systems"[0] for more information. [0] https://developer.arm.com/cache-speculation-vulnerability-firmware-specification Change-Id: I084aa7c3bc7c26bf2df2248301270f77bed22ceb Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
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