1. 11 Dec, 2018 4 commits
  2. 10 Dec, 2018 2 commits
  3. 15 Jul, 2018 1 commit
  4. 13 Jun, 2018 2 commits
    • Antonio Nino Diaz's avatar
      xlat v2: Introduce xlat granule size helpers · a0b9bb79
      Antonio Nino Diaz authored
      
      
      The function xlat_arch_is_granule_size_supported() can be used to check
      if a specific granule size is supported. In Armv8, AArch32 only supports
      4 KiB pages. AArch64 supports 4 KiB, 16 KiB or 64 KiB depending on the
      implementation, which is detected at runtime.
      
      The function xlat_arch_get_max_supported_granule_size() returns the max
      granule size supported by the implementation.
      
      Even though right now they are only used by SPM, they may be useful in
      other places in the future. This patch moves the code currently in SPM
      to the xlat tables lib so that it can be reused.
      
      Change-Id: If54624a5ecf20b9b9b7f38861b56383a03bbc8a4
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAntonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
      a0b9bb79
    • Antonio Nino Diaz's avatar
      SPM: Initialize SP args as expected by cm library · 83a393ba
      Antonio Nino Diaz authored
      
      
      In the context management library, cm_setup_context() takes the
      information in ep_info to fill the registers x0-x7. This patch replaces
      the current code that sets them manually by the correct initialization
      code.
      
      Change-Id: Id1fdf4681b154026c2e3af1f9b05b19582b7d16d
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAntonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
      83a393ba
  5. 23 May, 2018 2 commits
  6. 15 May, 2018 1 commit
    • Sandrine Bailleux's avatar
      SPM: Do not trap S-EL0 access to SVE/SIMD/FP regs · 39848945
      Sandrine Bailleux authored
      
      
      This allows secure partitions to access these registers. This is
      needed in some cases. For example, it has been reported that in order
      to implement secure storage services, a secure partition needs to
      encrypt/decrypt some authentication variables, which requires FP/SIMD
      support.
      
      Note that SPM will not do any saving/restoring of these registers on
      behalf of the SP. This falls under the SP's responsibility.
      
      Also note that if the SP gets preempted, it might not get a chance to
      save/restore FP/SIMD registers first. This patch does not address this
      problem. It only serves as a temporary solution to unblock development
      on the secure partition side.
      
      Change-Id: I3b8ccdebdac0219f6ac96ad66ab2be0be8374ad3
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
      39848945
  7. 21 Feb, 2018 1 commit
  8. 06 Dec, 2017 2 commits
  9. 15 Nov, 2017 1 commit
    • Antonio Nino Diaz's avatar
      SPM: Fix calculation of max page granularity · 9efd6e5c
      Antonio Nino Diaz authored
      
      
      The code was incorrectly reading from ID_AA64PRF0_EL1 instead of
      ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 causing the supported granularity sizes returned by the
      code to be wrong.
      
      This wasn't causing any problem because it's just used to check the
      alignment of the base of the buffer shared between Non-secure and Secure
      worlds, and it was aligned to more than 64 KiB, which is the maximum
      granularity supported by the architecture.
      
      Change-Id: Icc0d949d9521cc0ef13afb753825c475ea62d462
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAntonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
      9efd6e5c
  10. 10 Nov, 2017 1 commit
    • Antonio Nino Diaz's avatar
      SPM: Fix pointer to MP info in boot info struct · ff7d0805
      Antonio Nino Diaz authored
      
      
      The MP info struct is placed right after the boot info struct. However,
      when calculating the address of the MP info, the size of the boot info
      struct was being multiplied by the size of the MP boot info. This left
      a big gap of empty space between the structs.
      
      This didn't break any code because the boot info struct has a pointer to
      the MP info struct. It was just wasting space.
      
      Change-Id: I1668e3540d9173261968f6740623549000bd48db
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAntonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
      ff7d0805
  11. 08 Nov, 2017 1 commit
    • Antonio Nino Diaz's avatar
      SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager · 2fccb228
      Antonio Nino Diaz authored
      
      
      A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in
      S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security
      services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure
      Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be
      granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a
      software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in
      the Secure World and accesses the following system resources:
      
      - Memory and device regions in the system address map.
      - PE system registers.
      - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts.
      - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers.
      
      A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the
      absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in
      a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation
      cannot be overly complex.
      
      The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure
      Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is
      responsible for the following:
      
      - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition.
      - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a
        Secure Partition.
      - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world
        and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a
        Secure Partition.
      - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure
        Partition to fulfil service requests.
      - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure
        Partition to fulfil a service request.
      
      Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f
      Co-authored-by: default avatarDouglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
      Co-authored-by: default avatarSandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
      Co-authored-by: default avatarAchin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
      Co-authored-by: default avatarAntonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAntonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
      2fccb228