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The Armv8.5 extensions introduces PSTATE.SSBS (Speculation Store Bypass
Safe) bit to mitigate against Variant 4 vulnerabilities. Although an
Armv8.5 feature, this can be implemented by CPUs implementing earlier
version of the architecture.

With this patch, when both PSTATE.SSBS is implemented and
DYNAMIC_WORKAROUND_CVE_2018_3639 is active, querying for
SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 via. SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES call would return 1 to
indicate that mitigation on the PE is either permanently enabled or not
required.

When SSBS is implemented, SCTLR_EL3.DSSBS is initialized to 0 at reset
of every BL stage. This means that EL3 always executes with mitigation
applied.

For Cortex A76, if the PE implements SSBS, the existing mitigation (by
using a different vector table, and tweaking CPU ACTLR2) is not used.

Change-Id: Ib0386c5714184144d4747951751c2fc6ba4242b6
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

All identifiers, regardless of use, that start with two underscores are
reserved. This means they can't be used in header guards.

The style that this project is now to use the full name of the file in
capital letters followed by 'H'. For example, for a file called
"uart_example.h", the header guard is UART_EXAMPLE_H.

The exceptions are files that are imported from other projects:

- CryptoCell driver
- dt-bindings folders
- zlib headers

Change-Id: I50561bf6c88b491ec440d0c8385c74650f3c106e
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

This patch introduces two workarounds for ARMv7 systems.  The
workarounds need to be applied prior to any `branch` instruction in
secure world.  This is achieved using a custom vector table where each
entry is an `add sp, sp, #1` instruction.

On entry to monitor mode, once the sequence of `ADD` instructions is
executed, the branch target buffer (BTB) is invalidated.  The bottom
bits of `SP` are then used to decode the exception entry type.

A side effect of this change is that the exception vectors are
installed before the CPU specific reset function.  This is now
consistent with how it is done on AArch64.

Note, on AArch32 systems, the exception vectors are typically tightly
integrated with the secure payload (e.g. the Trusted OS).  This
workaround will need porting to each secure payload that requires it.

The patch to modify the AArch32 per-cpu vbar to the corresponding
workaround vector table according to the CPU type will be done in a
later patch.

Change-Id: I5786872497d359e496ebe0757e8017fa98f753fa
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>

This patch enables BL2 to execute at the highest exception level
without any dependancy on TF BL1. This enables platforms which already
have a non-TF Boot ROM to directly load and execute BL2 and subsequent BL
stages without need for BL1.  This is not currently possible because
BL2 executes at S-EL1 and cannot jump straight to EL3.

Change-Id: Ief1efca4598560b1b8c8e61fbe26d1f44e929d69
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>

Signed-off-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>

This patch updates the el3_arch_init_common macro so that it fully
initialises essential control registers rather then relying on hardware
to set the reset values.

The context management functions are also updated to fully initialise
the appropriate control registers when initialising the non-secure and
secure context structures and when preparing to leave EL3 for a lower
EL.

This gives better alignement with the ARM ARM which states that software
must initialise RES0 and RES1 fields with 0 / 1.

This patch also corrects the following typos:

"NASCR definitions" -> "NSACR definitions"

Change-Id: Ia8940b8351dc27bc09e2138b011e249655041cfc
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>

To make software license auditing simpler, use SPDX[0] license
identifiers instead of duplicating the license text in every file.

NOTE: Files that have been imported by FreeBSD have not been modified.

[0]: https://spdx.org/



Change-Id: I80a00e1f641b8cc075ca5a95b10607ed9ed8761a
Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>

The build option `ENABLE_ASSERTIONS` should be used instead. That way
both C and ASM assertions can be enabled or disabled together.

All occurrences of `ASM_ASSERTION` in common code and ARM platforms have
been replaced by `ENABLE_ASSERTIONS`.

ASM_ASSERTION has been removed from the user guide.

Change-Id: I51f1991f11b9b7ff83e787c9a3270c274748ec6f
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

Introduce new build option ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR. It enables
compilation of all BL images with one of the GCC -fstack-protector-*
options.

A new platform function plat_get_stack_protector_canary() is introduced.
It returns a value that is used to initialize the canary for stack
corruption detection. Returning a random value will prevent an attacker
from predicting the value and greatly increase the effectiveness of the
protection.

A message is printed at the ERROR level when a stack corruption is
detected.

To be effective, the global data must be stored at an address
lower than the base of the stacks. Failure to do so would allow an
attacker to overwrite the canary as part of an attack which would void
the protection.

FVP implementation of plat_get_stack_protector_canary is weak as
there is no real source of entropy on the FVP. It therefore relies on a
timer's value, which could be predictable.

Change-Id: Icaaee96392733b721fa7c86a81d03660d3c1bc06
Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>

Trusted Firmware currently has no support for secure self-hosted
debug.  To avoid unexpected exceptions, disable software debug
exceptions, other than software breakpoint instruction exceptions,
from all exception levels in secure state.  This applies to both
AArch32 and AArch64 EL3 initialization.

Change-Id: Id097e54a6bbcd0ca6a2be930df5d860d8d09e777
Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>

One nasty part of ATF is some of boolean macros are always defined
as 1 or 0, and the rest of them are only defined under certain
conditions.

For the former group, "#if FOO" or "#if !FOO" must be used because
"#ifdef FOO" is always true.  (Options passed by $(call add_define,)
are the cases.)

For the latter, "#ifdef FOO" or "#ifndef FOO" should be used because
checking the value of an undefined macro is strange.

Here, IMAGE_BL* is handled by make_helpers/build_macro.mk like
follows:

  $(eval IMAGE := IMAGE_BL$(call uppercase,$(3)))

  $(OBJ): $(2)
          @echo "  CC      $$<"
          $$(Q)$$(CC) $$(TF_CFLAGS) $$(CFLAGS) -D$(IMAGE) -c $$< -o $$@

This means, IMAGE_BL* is defined when building the corresponding
image, but *undefined* for the other images.

So, IMAGE_BL* belongs to the latter group where we should use #ifdef
or #ifndef.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>

There are many instances in ARM Trusted Firmware where control is
transferred to functions from which return isn't expected. Such jumps
are made using 'bl' instruction to provide the callee with the location
from which it was jumped to. Additionally, debuggers infer the caller by
examining where 'lr' register points to. If a 'bl' of the nature
described above falls at the end of an assembly function, 'lr' will be
left pointing to a location outside of the function range. This misleads
the debugger back trace.

This patch defines a 'no_ret' macro to be used when jumping to functions
from which return isn't expected. The macro ensures to use 'bl'
instruction for the jump, and also, for debug builds, places a 'nop'
instruction immediately thereafter (unless instructed otherwise) so as
to leave 'lr' pointing within the function range.

Change-Id: Ib34c69fc09197cfd57bc06e147cc8252910e01b0
Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

This patch resets EL2 and EL3 registers that have architecturally
UNKNOWN values on reset and that also provide EL2/EL3 configuration
and trap controls.

Specifically, the EL2 physical timer is disabled to prevent timer
interrups into EL2 - CNTHP_CTL_EL2 and CNTHP_CTL for AArch64 and AArch32,
respectively.

Additionally, for AArch64, HSTR_EL2 is reset to avoid unexpected traps of
non-secure access to certain system registers at EL1 or lower.

For AArch32, the patch also reverts the reset to SDCR which was
incorrectly added in a previous change.

Change-Id: If00eaa23afa7dd36a922265194ccd6223187414f
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>

In order to avoid unexpected traps into EL3/MON mode, this patch
resets the debug registers, MDCR_EL3 and MDCR_EL2 for AArch64,
and SDCR and HDCR for AArch32.

MDCR_EL3/SDCR is zero'ed when EL3/MON mode is entered, at the
start of BL1 and BL31/SMP_MIN.

For MDCR_EL2/HDCR, this patch zero's the bits that are
architecturally UNKNOWN values on reset. This is done when
exiting from EL3/MON mode but only on platforms that support
EL2/HYP mode but choose to exit to EL1/SVC mode.

Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#430

Change-Id: Idb992232163c072faa08892251b5626ae4c3a5b6
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>

At present the `el3_entrypoint_common` macro uses `memcpy`
function defined in lib/stdlib/mem.c file, to copy data
from ROM to RAM for BL1. Depending on the compiler being
used the stack could potentially be used, in `memcpy`,
for storing the local variables. Since the stack is
initialized much later in `el3_entrypoint_common` it
may result in unknown behaviour.

This patch adds `memcpy4` function definition in assembly so
that it can be used before the stack is initialized and it
also replaces `memcpy` by `memcpy4` in `el3_entrypoint_common`
macro, to copy data from ROM to RAM for BL1.

Change-Id: I3357a0e8095f05f71bbbf0b185585d9499bfd5e0

This patch adds common changes to support AArch32 state in
BL1 and BL2. Following are the changes:

* Added functions for disabling MMU from Secure state.
* Added AArch32 specific SMC function.
* Added semihosting support.
* Added reporting of unhandled exceptions.
* Added uniprocessor stack support.
* Added `el3_entrypoint_common` macro that can be
  shared by BL1 and BL32 (SP_MIN) BL stages. The
  `el3_entrypoint_common` is similar to the AArch64
  counterpart with the main difference in the assembly
  instructions and the registers that are relevant to
  AArch32 execution state.
* Enabled `LOAD_IMAGE_V2` flag in Makefile for
  `ARCH=aarch32` and added check to make sure that
  platform has not overridden to disable it.

Change-Id: I33c6d8dfefb2e5d142fdfd06a0f4a7332962e1a3

This patch moves assembler macros which are not architecture specific
to a new file `asm_macros_common.S` and moves the `el3_common_macros.S`
into `aarch64` specific folder.

Change-Id: I444a1ee3346597bf26a8b827480cd9640b38c826

This patch enables the SCR_EL3.SIF (Secure Instruction Fetch) bit in BL1 and
BL31 common architectural setup code. When in secure state, this disables
instruction fetches from Non-secure memory.

NOTE: THIS COULD BREAK PLATFORMS THAT HAVE SECURE WORLD CODE EXECUTING FROM
NON-SECURE MEMORY, BUT THIS IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY AND IS A SERIOUS SECURITY
RISK.

Fixes ARM-Software/tf-issues#372

Change-Id: I684e84b8d523c3b246e9a5fabfa085b6405df319

Asynchronous abort exceptions generated by the platform during cold boot are
not taken in EL3 unless SCR_EL3.EA is set.

Therefore EA bit is set along with RES1 bits in early BL1 and BL31 architecture
initialisation. Further write accesses to SCR_EL3 preserve these bits during
cold boot.

A build flag controls SCR_EL3.EA value to keep asynchronous abort exceptions
being trapped by EL3 after cold boot or not.

For further reference SError Interrupts are also known as asynchronous external
aborts.

On Cortex-A53 revisions below r0p2, asynchronous abort exceptions are taken in
EL3 whatever the SCR_EL3.EA value is.

Fixes arm-software/tf-issues#368
Signed-off-by: Gerald Lejeune <gerald.lejeune@st.com>

Added a new platform porting function plat_panic_handler, to allow
platforms to handle unexpected error situations. It must be
implemented in assembly as it may be called before the C environment
is initialized. A default implementation is provided, which simply
spins.

Corrected all dead loops in generic code to call this function
instead. This includes the dead loop that occurs at the end of the
call to panic().

All unnecesary wfis from bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_exceptions.S have
been removed.

Change-Id: I67cb85f6112fa8e77bd62f5718efcef4173d8134

The previous reset code in BL1 performed the following steps in
order:

1. Warm/Cold boot detection.
   If it's a warm boot, jump to warm boot entrypoint.

2. Primary/Secondary CPU detection.
   If it's a secondary CPU, jump to plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup(),
   which doesn't return.

3. CPU initialisations (cache, TLB...).

4. Memory and C runtime initialization.

For a secondary CPU, steps 3 and 4 are never reached. This shouldn't
be a problem in most cases, since current implementations of
plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup() either panic or power down the
secondary CPUs.

The main concern is the lack of secondary CPU initialization when
bare metal EL3 payloads are used in case they don't take care of this
initialisation themselves.

This patch moves the detection of primary/secondary CPU after step 3
so that the CPU initialisations are performed per-CPU, while the
memory and the C runtime initialisation are only performed on the
primary CPU. The diagrams used in the ARM Trusted Firmware Reset
Design documentation file have been updated to reflect the new boot
flow.

Platforms ports might be affected by this patch depending on the
behaviour of plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup(), as the state of the
platform when entering this function will be different.

Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#342

Change-Id: Icbf4a0ee2a3e5b856030064472f9fa6696f2eb9e

This patch removes the dash character from the image name, to
follow the image terminology in the Trusted Firmware Wiki page:

    https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/wiki

Changes apply to output messages, comments and documentation.

non-ARM platform files have been left unmodified.

Change-Id: Ic2a99be4ed929d52afbeb27ac765ceffce46ed76

As of now BL1 loads and execute BL2 based on hard coded information
provided in BL1. But due to addition of support for upcoming Firmware
Update feature, BL1 now require more flexible approach to load and
run different images using information provided by the platform.

This patch adds new mechanism to load and execute images based on
platform provided image id's. BL1 now queries the platform to fetch
the image id of the next image to be loaded and executed. In order
to achieve this, a new struct image_desc_t was added which holds the
information about images, such as: ep_info and image_info.

This patch introduces following platform porting functions:

unsigned int bl1_plat_get_next_image_id(void);
	This is used to identify the next image to be loaded
	and executed by BL1.

struct image_desc *bl1_plat_get_image_desc(unsigned int image_id);
	This is used to retrieve the image_desc for given image_id.

void bl1_plat_set_ep_info(unsigned int image_id,
struct entry_point_info *ep_info);
	This function allows platforms to update ep_info for given
	image_id.

The plat_bl1_common.c file provides default weak implementations of
all above functions, the `bl1_plat_get_image_desc()` always return
BL2 image descriptor, the `bl1_plat_get_next_image_id()` always return
BL2 image ID and `bl1_plat_set_ep_info()` is empty and just returns.
These functions gets compiled into all BL1 platforms by default.

Platform setup in BL1, using `bl1_platform_setup()`, is now done
_after_ the initialization of authentication module. This change
provides the opportunity to use authentication while doing the
platform setup in BL1.

In order to store secure/non-secure context, BL31 uses percpu_data[]
to store context pointer for each core. In case of BL1 only the
primary CPU will be active hence percpu_data[] is not required to
store the context pointer.

This patch introduce bl1_cpu_context[] and bl1_cpu_context_ptr[] to
store the context and context pointers respectively. It also also
re-defines cm_get_context() and cm_set_context() for BL1 in
bl1/bl1_context_mgmt.c.

BL1 now follows the BL31 pattern of using SP_EL0 for the C runtime
environment, to support resuming execution from a previously saved
context.

NOTE: THE `bl1_plat_set_bl2_ep_info()` PLATFORM PORTING FUNCTION IS
      NO LONGER CALLED BY BL1 COMMON CODE. PLATFORMS THAT OVERRIDE
      THIS FUNCTION MAY NEED TO IMPLEMENT `bl1_plat_set_ep_info()`
      INSTEAD TO MAINTAIN EXISTING BEHAVIOUR.

Change-Id: Ieee4c124b951c2e9bc1c1013fa2073221195d881

On the ARMv8 architecture, cache maintenance operations by set/way on the last
level of integrated cache do not affect the system cache. This means that such a
flush or clean operation could result in the data being pushed out to the system
cache rather than main memory. Another CPU could access this data before it
enables its data cache or MMU. Such accesses could be serviced from the main
memory instead of the system cache. If the data in the sysem cache has not yet
been flushed or evicted to main memory then there could be a loss of
coherency. The only mechanism to guarantee that the main memory will be updated
is to use cache maintenance operations to the PoC by MVA(See section D3.4.11
(System level caches) of ARMv8-A Reference Manual (Issue A.g/ARM DDI0487A.G).

This patch removes the reliance of Trusted Firmware on the flush by set/way
operation to ensure visibility of data in the main memory. Cache maintenance
operations by MVA are now used instead. The following are the broad category of
changes:

1. The RW areas of BL2/BL31/BL32 are invalidated by MVA before the C runtime is
   initialised. This ensures that any stale cache lines at any level of cache
   are removed.

2. Updates to global data in runtime firmware (BL31) by the primary CPU are made
   visible to secondary CPUs using a cache clean operation by MVA.

3. Cache maintenance by set/way operations are only used prior to power down.

NOTE: NON-UPSTREAM TRUSTED FIRMWARE CODE SHOULD MAKE EQUIVALENT CHANGES IN
ORDER TO FUNCTION CORRECTLY ON PLATFORMS WITH SUPPORT FOR SYSTEM CACHES.

Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#205

Change-Id: I64f1b398de0432813a0e0881d70f8337681f6e9a

This patch adds the necessary documentation updates to porting_guide.md
for the changes in the platform interface mandated as a result of the new
PSCI Topology and power state management frameworks. It also adds a
new document `platform-migration-guide.md` to aid the migration of existing
platform ports to the new API.

The patch fixes the implementation and callers of
plat_is_my_cpu_primary() to use w0 as the return parameter as implied by
the function signature rather than x0 which was used previously.

Change-Id: Ic11e73019188c8ba2bd64c47e1729ff5acdcdd5b

This patch migrates the rest of Trusted Firmware excluding Secure Payload and
the dispatchers to the new platform and context management API. The per-cpu
data framework APIs which took MPIDRs as their arguments are deleted and only
the ones which take core index as parameter are retained.

Change-Id: I839d05ad995df34d2163a1cfed6baa768a5a595d

This patch fixes the build time condition deciding whether the
read-write data should be relocated from ROM to RAM. It was incorrectly
using __DATA_ROM_START__, which is a linker symbol and not a compiler
build flag. As a result, the relocation code was always compiled out.

This bug has been introduced by the following patch:
"Rationalize reset handling code"

Change-Id: I1c8d49de32f791551ab4ac832bd45101d6934045

The attempt to run the CPU reset code as soon as possible after reset
results in highly complex conditional code relating to the
RESET_TO_BL31 option.

This patch relaxes this requirement a little. In the BL1, BL3-1 and
PSCI entrypoints code, the sequence of operations is now as follows:
 1) Detect whether it is a cold or warm boot;
 2) For cold boot, detect whether it is the primary or a secondary
    CPU. This is needed to handle multiple CPUs entering cold reset
    simultaneously;
 3) Run the CPU init code.

This patch also abstracts the EL3 registers initialisation done by
the BL1, BL3-1 and PSCI entrypoints into common code.

This improves code re-use and consolidates the code flows for
different types of systems.

NOTE: THE FUNCTION plat_secondary_cold_boot() IS NOW EXPECTED TO
NEVER RETURN. THIS PATCH FORCES PLATFORM PORTS THAT RELIED ON THE
FORMER RETRY LOOP AT THE CALL SITE TO MODIFY THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.
OTHERWISE, SECONDARY CPUS WILL PANIC.

Change-Id: If5ecd74d75bee700b1bd718d23d7556b8f863546