1. 09 Mar, 2020 9 commits
  2. 06 Mar, 2020 4 commits
  3. 05 Mar, 2020 2 commits
  4. 04 Mar, 2020 1 commit
    • Manish Pandey's avatar
      SPMD: loading Secure Partition payloads · cb3b5344
      Manish Pandey authored
      
      
      This patch implements loading of Secure Partition packages using
      existing framework of loading other bl images.
      
      The current framework uses a statically defined array to store all the
      possible image types and at run time generates a link list and traverse
      through it to load different images.
      
      To load SPs, a new array of fixed size is introduced which will be
      dynamically populated based on number of SPs available in the system
      and it will be appended to the loadable images list.
      
      Change-Id: I8309f63595f2a71b28a73b922d20ccba9c4f6ae4
      Signed-off-by: default avatarManish Pandey <manish.pandey2@arm.com>
      cb3b5344
  5. 03 Mar, 2020 4 commits
  6. 27 Feb, 2020 2 commits
  7. 26 Feb, 2020 1 commit
    • Masahiro Yamada's avatar
      uniphier: prepare uniphier_soc_info() for next SoC · dd53cfe1
      Masahiro Yamada authored
      
      
      The revision register address will be changed in the next SoC.
      
      The LSI revision is needed in order to know where the revision
      register is located, but you need to read out the revision
      register for that. This is impossible.
      
      We need to know the revision register address by other means.
      Use BL_CODE_BASE, where the base address of the TF image that is
      currently running. If it is bigger than 0x80000000 (i.e. the DRAM
      base is 0x80000000), we assume it is a legacy SoC.
      
      Change-Id: I9d7f4325fe2085a8a1ab5310025e5948da611256
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMasahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
      dd53cfe1
  8. 25 Feb, 2020 15 commits
  9. 24 Feb, 2020 2 commits
    • Petre-Ionut Tudor's avatar
      Read-only xlat tables for BL31 memory · 60e8f3cf
      Petre-Ionut Tudor authored
      
      
      This patch introduces a build flag which allows the xlat tables
      to be mapped in a read-only region within BL31 memory. It makes it
      much harder for someone who has acquired the ability to write to
      arbitrary secure memory addresses to gain control of the
      translation tables.
      
      The memory attributes of the descriptors describing the tables
      themselves are changed to read-only secure data. This change
      happens at the end of BL31 runtime setup. Until this point, the
      tables have read-write permissions. This gives a window of
      opportunity for changes to be made to the tables with the MMU on
      (e.g. reclaiming init code). No changes can be made to the tables
      with the MMU turned on from this point onwards. This change is also
      enabled for sp_min and tspd.
      
      To make all this possible, the base table was moved to .rodata. The
      penalty we pay is that now .rodata must be aligned to the size of
      the base table (512B alignment). Still, this is better than putting
      the base table with the higher level tables in the xlat_table
      section, as that would cost us a full 4KB page.
      
      Changing the tables from read-write to read-only cannot be done with
      the MMU on, as the break-before-make sequence would invalidate the
      descriptor which resolves the level 3 page table where that very
      descriptor is located. This would make the translation required for
      writing the changes impossible, generating an MMU fault.
      
      The caches are also flushed.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarPetre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com>
      Change-Id: Ibe5de307e6dc94c67d6186139ac3973516430466
      60e8f3cf
    • Julius Werner's avatar
      mt8173: Add support for new watchdog SMC · e9cf1bcc
      Julius Werner authored
      
      
      This patch adds support for a new SMC that can be used to control the
      watchdog. This allows for a cleaner separation of responsibilities where
      all watchdog operations have to go through Trusted Firmware and we could
      no longer have kernel and firmware poking concurrently at the same
      register block.
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJulius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarEvan Benn <evanbenn@chromium.org>
      Change-Id: I4844a3559d5c956a53a74a61dd5bc2956f0cce7b
      e9cf1bcc