GitLab

This patch enables BL2 to run in root world (EL3) which is
needed as per the security model of RME-enabled systems.
Signed-off-by: John Powell <john.powell@arm.com>
Change-Id: I53ace51e326fcdd44d44c791a7cb9ffaa20ed3f5

If FEAT_PMUv3 is implemented and PMEVTYPER<n>(_EL0).MT bit is implemented
as well, it is possible to control whether PMU counters take into account
events happening on other threads.

If FEAT_MTPMU is implemented, EL3 (or EL2) can override the MT bit
leaving it to effective state of 0 regardless of any write to it.

This patch introduces the DISABLE_MTPMU flag, which allows to diable
multithread event count from EL3 (or EL2). The flag is disabled
by default so the behavior is consistent with those architectures
that do not implement FEAT_MTPMU.
Signed-off-by: Javier Almansa Sobrino <javier.almansasobrino@arm.com>
Change-Id: Iee3a8470ae8ba13316af1bd40c8d4aa86e0cb85e

Usually, C has no problem up-converting types to larger bit sizes. MISRA
rule 10.7 requires that you not do this, or be very explicit about this.
This resolves the following required rule:

    bl1/aarch64/bl1_context_mgmt.c:81:[MISRA C-2012 Rule 10.7 (required)]<None>
    The width of the composite expression "0U | ((mode & 3U) << 2U) | 1U |
    0x3c0U" (32 bits) is less that the right hand operand
    "18446744073709547519ULL" (64 bits).

This also resolves MISRA defects such as:

    bl2/aarch64/bl2arch_setup.c:18:[MISRA C-2012 Rule 12.2 (required)]
    In the expression "3U << 20", shifting more than 7 bits, the number
    of bits in the essential type of the left expression, "3U", is
    not allowed.

Further, MISRA requires that all shifts don't overflow. The definition of
PAGE_SIZE was (1U << 12), and 1U is 8 bits. This caused about 50 issues.
This fixes the violation by changing the definition to 1UL << 12. Since
this uses 32bits, it should not create any issues for aarch32.

This patch also contains a fix for a build failure in the sun50i_a64
platform. Specifically, these misra fixes removed a single and
instruction,

    92407e73        and     x19, x19, #0xffffffff

from the cm_setup_context function caused a relocation in
psci_cpus_on_start to require a linker-generated stub. This increased the
size of the .text section and caused an alignment later on to go over a
page boundary and round up to the end of RAM before placing the .data
section. This sectionn is of non-zero size and therefore causes a link
error.

The fix included in this reorders the functions during link time
without changing their ording with respect to alignment.

Change-Id: I76b4b662c3d262296728a8b9aab7a33b02087f16
Signed-off-by: Jimmy Brisson <jimmy.brisson@arm.com>

As per latest mailing communication [1], we decided to
update AT speculative workaround implementation in order to
disable page table walk for lower ELs(EL1 or EL0) immediately
after context switching to EL3 from lower ELs.

Previous implementation of AT speculative workaround is available
here: 45aecff0

AT speculative workaround is updated as below:
1. Avoid saving and restoring of SCTLR and TCR registers for EL1
   in context save and restore routine respectively.
2. On EL3 entry, save SCTLR and TCR registers for EL1.
3. On EL3 entry, update EL1 system registers to disable stage 1
   page table walk for lower ELs (EL1 and EL0) and enable EL1
   MMU.
4. On EL3 exit, restore SCTLR and TCR registers for EL1 which
   are saved in step 2.

[1]:
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-a/2020-July/000586.html



Change-Id: Iee8de16f81dc970a8f492726f2ddd57e7bd9ffb5
Signed-off-by: Manish V Badarkhe <Manish.Badarkhe@arm.com>

This patch fixes compilation errors when ENABLE_PIE=1.

<snip>
bl31/aarch64/bl31_entrypoint.S: Assembler messages:
bl31/aarch64/bl31_entrypoint.S:61: Error: invalid operand (*UND* section) for `~'
bl31/aarch64/bl31_entrypoint.S:61: Error: invalid immediate
Makefile:1079: recipe for target 'build/tegra/t194/debug/bl31/bl31_entrypoint.o' failed
<snip>

Verified by setting 'ENABLE_PIE=1' for Tegra platform builds.
Signed-off-by: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com>
Change-Id: Ifd184f89b86b4360fda86a6ce83fd8495f930bbc

Some platforms are extremely memory constrained and must split BL31
between multiple non-contiguous areas in SRAM. Allow the NOBITS
sections (.bss, stacks, page tables, and coherent memory) to be placed
in a separate region of RAM from the loaded firmware image.

Because the NOBITS region may be at a lower address than the rest of
BL31, __RW_{START,END}__ and __BL31_{START,END}__ cannot include this
region, or el3_entrypoint_common would attempt to invalidate the dcache
for the entire address space. New symbols __NOBITS_{START,END}__ are
added when SEPARATE_NOBITS_REGION is enabled, and the dcached for the
NOBITS region is invalidated separately.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Holland <samuel@sholland.org>
Change-Id: Idedfec5e4dbee77e94f2fdd356e6ae6f4dc79d37

When a Firmware is complied as Position Independent Executable it needs
to request GDT fixup by passing size of the memory region to
el3_entrypoint_common macro.
The Global descriptor table fixup will be done early on during cold boot
process of primary core.

Currently only BL31 supports PIE, but in future when BL2_AT_EL3 will be
compiled as PIE, it can simply pass fixup size to the common el3
entrypoint macro to fixup GDT.

The reason for this patch was to overcome the bug introduced by SHA
330ead80

 which called fixup routine for each core causing
re-initializing of global pointers thus overwriting any changes
done by the previous core.

Change-Id: I55c792cc3ea9e7eef34c2e4653afd04572c4f055
Signed-off-by: Manish Pandey <manish.pandey2@arm.com>

Currently the MDCR_EL3 initialisation implicitly disables
MDCR_EL3.SPME by using mov_imm.

This patch makes the SPME bit more visible by explicitly
disabling it and documenting its use in different versions
of the architecture.
Signed-off-by: Petre-Ionut Tudor <petre-ionut.tudor@arm.com>
Change-Id: I221fdf314f01622f46ac5aa43388f59fa17a29b3

Add the missing flag for aarch32 XIP memory mode. It was
previously added in aarch64 only.
Minor: Correct the aarch64 missing flag.
Signed-off-by: Lionel Debieve <lionel.debieve@st.com>
Change-Id: Iac0a7581a1fd580aececa75f97deb894858f776f

Some of the platform (ie. Agilex) make use of CCU IPs which will only be
initialized during bl2_el3_early_platform_setup. Any operation to the
cache beforehand will crash the platform. Hence, this will provide an
option to skip the data cache invalidation upon bl2 entry at EL3
Signed-off-by: Hadi Asyrafi <muhammad.hadi.asyrafi.abdul.halim@intel.com>
Change-Id: I2c924ed0589a72d0034714c31be8fe57237d1f06

This patch fixes an issue when secure world timing information
can be leaked because Secure Cycle Counter is not disabled.
For ARMv8.5 the counter gets disabled by setting MDCR_El3.SCCD
bit on CPU cold/warm boot.
For the earlier architectures PMCR_EL0 register is saved/restored
on secure world entry/exit from/to Non-secure state, and cycle
counting gets disabled by setting PMCR_EL0.DP bit.
'include\aarch64\arch.h' header file was tided up and new
ARMv8.5-PMU related definitions were added.

Change-Id: I6f56db6bc77504634a352388990ad925a69ebbfa
Signed-off-by: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>

ARMv8.3-PAuth adds functionality that supports address authentication of
the contents of a register before that register is used as the target of
an indirect branch, or as a load.

This feature is supported only in AArch64 state.

This feature is mandatory in ARMv8.3 implementations.

This feature adds several registers to EL1. A new option called
CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS has been added to select if the TF needs to save
them during Non-secure <-> Secure world switches. This option must be
enabled if the hardware has the registers or the values will be leaked
during world switches.

To prevent leaks, this patch also disables pointer authentication in the
Secure world if CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS is 0. Any attempt to use it will
be trapped in EL3.

Change-Id: I27beba9907b9a86c6df1d0c5bf6180c972830855
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

In a system with ARMv8.5-PMU implemented:

- If EL3 is using AArch32, setting MDCR_EL3.SCCD to 1 disables counting
  in Secure state in PMCCNTR.

- If EL3 is using AArch64, setting SDCR.SCCD to 1 disables counting in
  Secure state in PMCCNTR_EL0.

So far this effect has been achieved by setting PMCR_EL0.DP (in AArch64)
or PMCR.DP (in AArch32) to 1 instead, but this isn't considered secure
as any EL can change that value.

Change-Id: I82cbb3e48f2e5a55c44d9c4445683c5881ef1f6f
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

The architecture dependant header files in include/lib/${ARCH} and
include/common/${ARCH} have been moved to /include/arch/${ARCH}.

Change-Id: I96f30fdb80b191a51448ddf11b1d4a0624c03394
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

This patch enables the Data Independent Timing
functionality (DIT) in EL3 if supported
by the platform.

Change-Id: Ia527d6aa2ee88a9a9fe1c941220404b9ff5567e5
Signed-off-by: Sathees Balya <sathees.balya@arm.com>

The Armv8.5 extensions introduces PSTATE.SSBS (Speculation Store Bypass
Safe) bit to mitigate against Variant 4 vulnerabilities. Although an
Armv8.5 feature, this can be implemented by CPUs implementing earlier
version of the architecture.

With this patch, when both PSTATE.SSBS is implemented and
DYNAMIC_WORKAROUND_CVE_2018_3639 is active, querying for
SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 via. SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES call would return 1 to
indicate that mitigation on the PE is either permanently enabled or not
required.

When SSBS is implemented, SCTLR_EL3.DSSBS is initialized to 0 at reset
of every BL stage. This means that EL3 always executes with mitigation
applied.

For Cortex A76, if the PE implements SSBS, the existing mitigation (by
using a different vector table, and tweaking CPU ACTLR2) is not used.

Change-Id: Ib0386c5714184144d4747951751c2fc6ba4242b6
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

All identifiers, regardless of use, that start with two underscores are
reserved. This means they can't be used in header guards.

The style that this project is now to use the full name of the file in
capital letters followed by 'H'. For example, for a file called
"uart_example.h", the header guard is UART_EXAMPLE_H.

The exceptions are files that are imported from other projects:

- CryptoCell driver
- dt-bindings folders
- zlib headers

Change-Id: I50561bf6c88b491ec440d0c8385c74650f3c106e
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

This patch fixes up the AArch64 assembly code to use
adrp/adr instructions instead of ldr instruction for
reference to symbols. This allows these assembly
sequences to be Position Independant. Note that the
the reference to sizes have been replaced with
calculation of size at runtime. This is because size
is a constant value and does not depend on execution
address and using PC relative instructions for loading
them makes them relative to execution address. Also
we cannot use `ldr` instruction to load size as it
generates a dynamic relocation entry which must *not*
be fixed up and it is difficult for a dynamic loader
to differentiate which entries need to be skipped.

Change-Id: I8bf4ed5c58a9703629e5498a27624500ef40a836
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>

Pointer authentication is an Armv8.3 feature that introduces
instructions that can be used to authenticate and verify pointers.

Pointer authentication instructions are allowed to be accessed from all
ELs but only when EL3 explicitly allows for it; otherwise, their usage
will trap to EL3. Since EL3 doesn't have trap handling in place, this
patch unconditionally disables all related traps to EL3 to avoid
potential misconfiguration leading to an unhandled EL3 exception.

Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#629

Change-Id: I9bd2efe0dc714196f503713b721ffbf05672c14d
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

File: include/common/aarch64/el3_common_macros.S

Change-Id: I619401e961a3f627ad8864781b5f90bc747c3ddb
Signed-off-by: Qixiang Xu <qixiang.xu@arm.com>

For the adr instruction, it require the label's offset from the
address of this instruction must be in the range +/-1MB. If the
option "BL2_IN_XIP_MEM" is set to '1', in some cases, BL2's RW
memory will not in the range of +/-1MB from BL2's RO memory region.
so we need to use ldr instruction to cover this case.
Signed-off-by: Jiafei Pan <Jiafei.Pan@nxp.com>

In some use-cases BL2 will be stored in eXecute In Place (XIP) memory,
like BL1. In these use-cases, it is necessary to initialize the RW sections
in RAM, while leaving the RO sections in place. This patch enable this
use-case with a new build option, BL2_IN_XIP_MEM. For now, this option
is only supported when BL2_AT_EL3 is 1.
Signed-off-by: Jiafei Pan <Jiafei.Pan@nxp.com>

This patch enables BL2 to execute at the highest exception level
without any dependancy on TF BL1. This enables platforms which already
have a non-TF Boot ROM to directly load and execute BL2 and subsequent BL
stages without need for BL1.  This is not currently possible because
BL2 executes at S-EL1 and cannot jump straight to EL3.

Change-Id: Ief1efca4598560b1b8c8e61fbe26d1f44e929d69
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>

Invalidate the Branch Target Buffer (BTB) on entry to EL3 by disabling
and enabling the MMU.  To achieve this without performing any branch
instruction, a per-cpu vbar is installed which executes the workaround
and then branches off to the corresponding vector entry in the main
vector table.  A side effect of this change is that the main vbar is
configured before any reset handling.  This is to allow the per-cpu
reset function to override the vbar setting.

This workaround is enabled by default on the affected CPUs.

Change-Id: I97788d38463a5840a410e3cea85ed297a1678265
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>

This patch adds a new build option, ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS, which when set
to one EL3 will check to see if the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE) is
implemented when entering and exiting the Non-secure world.

If SVE is implemented, EL3 will do the following:

- Entry to Non-secure world: SIMD, FP and SVE functionality is enabled.

- Exit from Non-secure world: SIMD, FP and SVE functionality is
  disabled. As SIMD and FP registers are part of the SVE Z-registers
  then any use of SIMD / FP functionality would corrupt the SVE
  registers.

The build option default is 1. The SVE functionality is only supported
on AArch64 and so the build option is set to zero when the target
archiecture is AArch32.

This build option is not compatible with the CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS - an
assert will be raised on platforms where SVE is implemented and both
ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS and CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS are set to 1.

Also note this change prevents secure world use of FP&SIMD registers on
SVE-enabled platforms. Existing Secure-EL1 Payloads will not work on
such platforms unless ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS is set to 0.

Additionally, on the first entry into the Non-secure world the SVE
functionality is enabled and the SVE Z-register length is set to the
maximum size allowed by the architecture. This includes the use case
where EL2 is implemented but not used.

Change-Id: Ie2d733ddaba0b9bef1d7c9765503155188fe7dae
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>

Factor out SPE operations in a separate file.  Use the publish
subscribe framework to drain the SPE buffers before entering secure
world.  Additionally, enable SPE before entering normal world.

A side effect of this change is that the profiling buffers are now
only drained when a transition from normal world to secure world
happens.  Previously they were drained also on return from secure
world, which is unnecessary as SPE is not supported in S-EL1.

Change-Id: I17582c689b4b525770dbb6db098b3a0b5777b70a
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>

SPE is only supported in non-secure state.  Accesses to SPE specific
registers from SEL1 will trap to EL3.  During a world switch, before
`TTBR` is modified the SPE profiling buffers are drained.  This is to
avoid a potential invalid memory access in SEL1.

SPE is architecturally specified only for AArch64.

Change-Id: I04a96427d9f9d586c331913d815fdc726855f6b0
Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>

This patch updates the el3_arch_init_common macro so that it fully
initialises essential control registers rather then relying on hardware
to set the reset values.

The context management functions are also updated to fully initialise
the appropriate control registers when initialising the non-secure and
secure context structures and when preparing to leave EL3 for a lower
EL.

This gives better alignement with the ARM ARM which states that software
must initialise RES0 and RES1 fields with 0 / 1.

This patch also corrects the following typos:

"NASCR definitions" -> "NSACR definitions"

Change-Id: Ia8940b8351dc27bc09e2138b011e249655041cfc
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>

To make software license auditing simpler, use SPDX[0] license
identifiers instead of duplicating the license text in every file.

NOTE: Files that have been imported by FreeBSD have not been modified.

[0]: https://spdx.org/



Change-Id: I80a00e1f641b8cc075ca5a95b10607ed9ed8761a
Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>

Introduce new build option ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR. It enables
compilation of all BL images with one of the GCC -fstack-protector-*
options.

A new platform function plat_get_stack_protector_canary() is introduced.
It returns a value that is used to initialize the canary for stack
corruption detection. Returning a random value will prevent an attacker
from predicting the value and greatly increase the effectiveness of the
protection.

A message is printed at the ERROR level when a stack corruption is
detected.

To be effective, the global data must be stored at an address
lower than the base of the stacks. Failure to do so would allow an
attacker to overwrite the canary as part of an attack which would void
the protection.

FVP implementation of plat_get_stack_protector_canary is weak as
there is no real source of entropy on the FVP. It therefore relies on a
timer's value, which could be predictable.

Change-Id: Icaaee96392733b721fa7c86a81d03660d3c1bc06
Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>

Trusted Firmware currently has no support for secure self-hosted
debug.  To avoid unexpected exceptions, disable software debug
exceptions, other than software breakpoint instruction exceptions,
from all exception levels in secure state.  This applies to both
AArch32 and AArch64 EL3 initialization.

Change-Id: Id097e54a6bbcd0ca6a2be930df5d860d8d09e777
Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>

Introduce zeromem_dczva function on AArch64 that can handle unaligned
addresses and make use of DC ZVA instruction to zero a whole block at a
time. This zeroing takes place directly in the cache to speed it up
without doing external memory access.

Remove the zeromem16 function on AArch64 and replace it with an alias to
zeromem. This zeromem16 function is now deprecated.

Remove the 16-bytes alignment constraint on __BSS_START__ in
firmware-design.md as it is now not mandatory anymore (it used to comply
with zeromem16 requirements).

Change the 16-bytes alignment constraints in SP min's linker script to a
8-bytes alignment constraint as the AArch32 zeromem implementation is now
more efficient on 8-bytes aligned addresses.

Introduce zero_normalmem and zeromem helpers in platform agnostic header
that are implemented this way:
* AArch32:
	* zero_normalmem: zero using usual data access
	* zeromem: alias for zero_normalmem
* AArch64:
	* zero_normalmem: zero normal memory  using DC ZVA instruction
	                  (needs MMU enabled)
	* zeromem: zero using usual data access

Usage guidelines: in most cases, zero_normalmem should be preferred.

There are 2 scenarios where zeromem (or memset) must be used instead:
* Code that must run with MMU disabled (which means all memory is
  considered device memory for data accesses).
* Code that fills device memory with null bytes.

Optionally, the following rule can be applied if performance is
important:
* Code zeroing small areas (few bytes) that are not secrets should use
  memset to take advantage of compiler optimizations.

  Note: Code zeroing security-related critical information should use
  zero_normalmem/zeromem instead of memset to avoid removal by
  compilers' optimizations in some cases or misbehaving versions of GCC.

Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#408

Change-Id: Iafd9663fc1070413c3e1904e54091cf60effaa82
Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>

One nasty part of ATF is some of boolean macros are always defined
as 1 or 0, and the rest of them are only defined under certain
conditions.

For the former group, "#if FOO" or "#if !FOO" must be used because
"#ifdef FOO" is always true.  (Options passed by $(call add_define,)
are the cases.)

For the latter, "#ifdef FOO" or "#ifndef FOO" should be used because
checking the value of an undefined macro is strange.

Here, IMAGE_BL* is handled by make_helpers/build_macro.mk like
follows:

  $(eval IMAGE := IMAGE_BL$(call uppercase,$(3)))

  $(OBJ): $(2)
          @echo "  CC      $$<"
          $$(Q)$$(CC) $$(TF_CFLAGS) $$(CFLAGS) -D$(IMAGE) -c $$< -o $$@

This means, IMAGE_BL* is defined when building the corresponding
image, but *undefined* for the other images.

So, IMAGE_BL* belongs to the latter group where we should use #ifdef
or #ifndef.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>

In order to avoid unexpected traps into EL3/MON mode, this patch
resets the debug registers, MDCR_EL3 and MDCR_EL2 for AArch64,
and SDCR and HDCR for AArch32.

MDCR_EL3/SDCR is zero'ed when EL3/MON mode is entered, at the
start of BL1 and BL31/SMP_MIN.

For MDCR_EL2/HDCR, this patch zero's the bits that are
architecturally UNKNOWN values on reset. This is done when
exiting from EL3/MON mode but only on platforms that support
EL2/HYP mode but choose to exit to EL1/SVC mode.

Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#430

Change-Id: Idb992232163c072faa08892251b5626ae4c3a5b6
Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>

This patch moves assembler macros which are not architecture specific
to a new file `asm_macros_common.S` and moves the `el3_common_macros.S`
into `aarch64` specific folder.

Change-Id: I444a1ee3346597bf26a8b827480cd9640b38c826

This patch enables the SCR_EL3.SIF (Secure Instruction Fetch) bit in BL1 and
BL31 common architectural setup code. When in secure state, this disables
instruction fetches from Non-secure memory.

NOTE: THIS COULD BREAK PLATFORMS THAT HAVE SECURE WORLD CODE EXECUTING FROM
NON-SECURE MEMORY, BUT THIS IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY AND IS A SERIOUS SECURITY
RISK.

Fixes ARM-Software/tf-issues#372

Change-Id: I684e84b8d523c3b246e9a5fabfa085b6405df319

Asynchronous abort exceptions generated by the platform during cold boot are
not taken in EL3 unless SCR_EL3.EA is set.

Therefore EA bit is set along with RES1 bits in early BL1 and BL31 architecture
initialisation. Further write accesses to SCR_EL3 preserve these bits during
cold boot.

A build flag controls SCR_EL3.EA value to keep asynchronous abort exceptions
being trapped by EL3 after cold boot or not.

For further reference SError Interrupts are also known as asynchronous external
aborts.

On Cortex-A53 revisions below r0p2, asynchronous abort exceptions are taken in
EL3 whatever the SCR_EL3.EA value is.

Fixes arm-software/tf-issues#368
Signed-off-by: Gerald Lejeune <gerald.lejeune@st.com>

Added a new platform porting function plat_panic_handler, to allow
platforms to handle unexpected error situations. It must be
implemented in assembly as it may be called before the C environment
is initialized. A default implementation is provided, which simply
spins.

Corrected all dead loops in generic code to call this function
instead. This includes the dead loop that occurs at the end of the
call to panic().

All unnecesary wfis from bl32/tsp/aarch64/tsp_exceptions.S have
been removed.

Change-Id: I67cb85f6112fa8e77bd62f5718efcef4173d8134

The previous reset code in BL1 performed the following steps in
order:

1. Warm/Cold boot detection.
   If it's a warm boot, jump to warm boot entrypoint.

2. Primary/Secondary CPU detection.
   If it's a secondary CPU, jump to plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup(),
   which doesn't return.

3. CPU initialisations (cache, TLB...).

4. Memory and C runtime initialization.

For a secondary CPU, steps 3 and 4 are never reached. This shouldn't
be a problem in most cases, since current implementations of
plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup() either panic or power down the
secondary CPUs.

The main concern is the lack of secondary CPU initialization when
bare metal EL3 payloads are used in case they don't take care of this
initialisation themselves.

This patch moves the detection of primary/secondary CPU after step 3
so that the CPU initialisations are performed per-CPU, while the
memory and the C runtime initialisation are only performed on the
primary CPU. The diagrams used in the ARM Trusted Firmware Reset
Design documentation file have been updated to reflect the new boot
flow.

Platforms ports might be affected by this patch depending on the
behaviour of plat_secondary_cold_boot_setup(), as the state of the
platform when entering this function will be different.

Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#342

Change-Id: Icbf4a0ee2a3e5b856030064472f9fa6696f2eb9e

This patch removes the dash character from the image name, to
follow the image terminology in the Trusted Firmware Wiki page:

    https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/wiki

Changes apply to output messages, comments and documentation.

non-ARM platform files have been left unmodified.

Change-Id: Ic2a99be4ed929d52afbeb27ac765ceffce46ed76