- 07 Apr, 2018 1 commit
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Jiafei Pan authored
In some use-cases BL2 will be stored in eXecute In Place (XIP) memory, like BL1. In these use-cases, it is necessary to initialize the RW sections in RAM, while leaving the RO sections in place. This patch enable this use-case with a new build option, BL2_IN_XIP_MEM. For now, this option is only supported when BL2_AT_EL3 is 1. Signed-off-by: Jiafei Pan <Jiafei.Pan@nxp.com>
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- 18 Jan, 2018 1 commit
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Roberto Vargas authored
This patch enables BL2 to execute at the highest exception level without any dependancy on TF BL1. This enables platforms which already have a non-TF Boot ROM to directly load and execute BL2 and subsequent BL stages without need for BL1. This is not currently possible because BL2 executes at S-EL1 and cannot jump straight to EL3. Change-Id: Ief1efca4598560b1b8c8e61fbe26d1f44e929d69 Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>
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- 11 Jan, 2018 1 commit
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Dimitris Papastamos authored
Invalidate the Branch Target Buffer (BTB) on entry to EL3 by disabling and enabling the MMU. To achieve this without performing any branch instruction, a per-cpu vbar is installed which executes the workaround and then branches off to the corresponding vector entry in the main vector table. A side effect of this change is that the main vbar is configured before any reset handling. This is to allow the per-cpu reset function to override the vbar setting. This workaround is enabled by default on the affected CPUs. Change-Id: I97788d38463a5840a410e3cea85ed297a1678265 Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
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- 12 Dec, 2017 1 commit
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Julius Werner authored
This patch overhauls the console API to allow for multiple console instances of different drivers that are active at the same time. Instead of binding to well-known function names (like console_core_init), consoles now provide a register function (e.g. console_16550_register()) that will hook them into the list of active consoles. All console operations will be dispatched to all consoles currently in the list. The new API will be selected by the build-time option MULTI_CONSOLE_API, which defaults to ${ERROR_DEPRECATED} for now. The old console API code will be retained to stay backwards-compatible to older platforms, but should no longer be used for any newly added platforms and can hopefully be removed at some point in the future. The new console API is intended to be used for both normal (bootup) and crash use cases, freeing platforms of the need to set up the crash console separately. Consoles can be individually configured to be active active at boot (until first handoff to EL2), at runtime (after first handoff to EL2), and/or after a crash. Console drivers should set a sane default upon registration that can be overridden with the console_set_scope() call. Code to hook up the crash reporting mechanism to this framework will be added with a later patch. This patch only affects AArch64, but the new API could easily be ported to AArch32 as well if desired. Change-Id: I35c5aa2cb3f719cfddd15565eb13c7cde4162549 Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
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- 30 Nov, 2017 1 commit
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David Cunado authored
This patch adds a new build option, ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS, which when set to one EL3 will check to see if the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE) is implemented when entering and exiting the Non-secure world. If SVE is implemented, EL3 will do the following: - Entry to Non-secure world: SIMD, FP and SVE functionality is enabled. - Exit from Non-secure world: SIMD, FP and SVE functionality is disabled. As SIMD and FP registers are part of the SVE Z-registers then any use of SIMD / FP functionality would corrupt the SVE registers. The build option default is 1. The SVE functionality is only supported on AArch64 and so the build option is set to zero when the target archiecture is AArch32. This build option is not compatible with the CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS - an assert will be raised on platforms where SVE is implemented and both ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS and CTX_INCLUDE_FPREGS are set to 1. Also note this change prevents secure world use of FP&SIMD registers on SVE-enabled platforms. Existing Secure-EL1 Payloads will not work on such platforms unless ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS is set to 0. Additionally, on the first entry into the Non-secure world the SVE functionality is enabled and the SVE Z-register length is set to the maximum size allowed by the architecture. This includes the use case where EL2 is implemented but not used. Change-Id: Ie2d733ddaba0b9bef1d7c9765503155188fe7dae Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>
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- 20 Nov, 2017 1 commit
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Dimitris Papastamos authored
Factor out SPE operations in a separate file. Use the publish subscribe framework to drain the SPE buffers before entering secure world. Additionally, enable SPE before entering normal world. A side effect of this change is that the profiling buffers are now only drained when a transition from normal world to secure world happens. Previously they were drained also on return from secure world, which is unnecessary as SPE is not supported in S-EL1. Change-Id: I17582c689b4b525770dbb6db098b3a0b5777b70a Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
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- 08 Nov, 2017 1 commit
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Antonio Nino Diaz authored
A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in the Secure World and accesses the following system resources: - Memory and device regions in the system address map. - PE system registers. - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts. - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers. A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation cannot be overly complex. The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is responsible for the following: - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a Secure Partition. - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure Partition to fulfil service requests. - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure Partition to fulfil a service request. Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com> Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
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- 31 Aug, 2017 1 commit
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Douglas Raillard authored
Add Call Frame Information assembler directives to vector entries so that debuggers display the backtrace of functions that triggered a synchronous exception. For example, a function triggering a data abort will be easier to debug if the backtrace can be displayed from a breakpoint at the beginning of the synchronous exception vector. DS-5 needs CFI otherwise it will not attempt to display the backtrace. Other debuggers might have other needs. These debug information are stored in the ELF file but not in the final binary. Change-Id: I32dc4e4b7af02546c93c1a45c71a1f6d710d36b1 Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
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- 22 Jun, 2017 1 commit
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dp-arm authored
SPE is only supported in non-secure state. Accesses to SPE specific registers from SEL1 will trap to EL3. During a world switch, before `TTBR` is modified the SPE profiling buffers are drained. This is to avoid a potential invalid memory access in SEL1. SPE is architecturally specified only for AArch64. Change-Id: I04a96427d9f9d586c331913d815fdc726855f6b0 Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
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- 21 Jun, 2017 1 commit
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David Cunado authored
This patch updates the el3_arch_init_common macro so that it fully initialises essential control registers rather then relying on hardware to set the reset values. The context management functions are also updated to fully initialise the appropriate control registers when initialising the non-secure and secure context structures and when preparing to leave EL3 for a lower EL. This gives better alignement with the ARM ARM which states that software must initialise RES0 and RES1 fields with 0 / 1. This patch also corrects the following typos: "NASCR definitions" -> "NSACR definitions" Change-Id: Ia8940b8351dc27bc09e2138b011e249655041cfc Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>
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- 03 May, 2017 1 commit
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dp-arm authored
To make software license auditing simpler, use SPDX[0] license identifiers instead of duplicating the license text in every file. NOTE: Files that have been imported by FreeBSD have not been modified. [0]: https://spdx.org/ Change-Id: I80a00e1f641b8cc075ca5a95b10607ed9ed8761a Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
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- 31 Mar, 2017 1 commit
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Douglas Raillard authored
Introduce new build option ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR. It enables compilation of all BL images with one of the GCC -fstack-protector-* options. A new platform function plat_get_stack_protector_canary() is introduced. It returns a value that is used to initialize the canary for stack corruption detection. Returning a random value will prevent an attacker from predicting the value and greatly increase the effectiveness of the protection. A message is printed at the ERROR level when a stack corruption is detected. To be effective, the global data must be stored at an address lower than the base of the stacks. Failure to do so would allow an attacker to overwrite the canary as part of an attack which would void the protection. FVP implementation of plat_get_stack_protector_canary is weak as there is no real source of entropy on the FVP. It therefore relies on a timer's value, which could be predictable. Change-Id: Icaaee96392733b721fa7c86a81d03660d3c1bc06 Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
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- 15 Feb, 2017 1 commit
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dp-arm authored
Trusted Firmware currently has no support for secure self-hosted debug. To avoid unexpected exceptions, disable software debug exceptions, other than software breakpoint instruction exceptions, from all exception levels in secure state. This applies to both AArch32 and AArch64 EL3 initialization. Change-Id: Id097e54a6bbcd0ca6a2be930df5d860d8d09e777 Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
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- 06 Feb, 2017 1 commit
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Douglas Raillard authored
Introduce zeromem_dczva function on AArch64 that can handle unaligned addresses and make use of DC ZVA instruction to zero a whole block at a time. This zeroing takes place directly in the cache to speed it up without doing external memory access. Remove the zeromem16 function on AArch64 and replace it with an alias to zeromem. This zeromem16 function is now deprecated. Remove the 16-bytes alignment constraint on __BSS_START__ in firmware-design.md as it is now not mandatory anymore (it used to comply with zeromem16 requirements). Change the 16-bytes alignment constraints in SP min's linker script to a 8-bytes alignment constraint as the AArch32 zeromem implementation is now more efficient on 8-bytes aligned addresses. Introduce zero_normalmem and zeromem helpers in platform agnostic header that are implemented this way: * AArch32: * zero_normalmem: zero using usual data access * zeromem: alias for zero_normalmem * AArch64: * zero_normalmem: zero normal memory using DC ZVA instruction (needs MMU enabled) * zeromem: zero using usual data access Usage guidelines: in most cases, zero_normalmem should be preferred. There are 2 scenarios where zeromem (or memset) must be used instead: * Code that must run with MMU disabled (which means all memory is considered device memory for data accesses). * Code that fills device memory with null bytes. Optionally, the following rule can be applied if performance is important: * Code zeroing small areas (few bytes) that are not secrets should use memset to take advantage of compiler optimizations. Note: Code zeroing security-related critical information should use zero_normalmem/zeromem instead of memset to avoid removal by compilers' optimizations in some cases or misbehaving versions of GCC. Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#408 Change-Id: Iafd9663fc1070413c3e1904e54091cf60effaa82 Signed-off-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
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- 30 Jan, 2017 1 commit
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Jeenu Viswambharan authored
At present, spin locks can only defined from C files. Add some macros such that they can be defined from assembly files too. Change-Id: I64f0c214062f5c15b3c8b412c7f25c908e87d970 Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
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- 23 Jan, 2017 1 commit
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Masahiro Yamada authored
One nasty part of ATF is some of boolean macros are always defined as 1 or 0, and the rest of them are only defined under certain conditions. For the former group, "#if FOO" or "#if !FOO" must be used because "#ifdef FOO" is always true. (Options passed by $(call add_define,) are the cases.) For the latter, "#ifdef FOO" or "#ifndef FOO" should be used because checking the value of an undefined macro is strange. Here, IMAGE_BL* is handled by make_helpers/build_macro.mk like follows: $(eval IMAGE := IMAGE_BL$(call uppercase,$(3))) $(OBJ): $(2) @echo " CC $$<" $$(Q)$$(CC) $$(TF_CFLAGS) $$(CFLAGS) -D$(IMAGE) -c $$< -o $$@ This means, IMAGE_BL* is defined when building the corresponding image, but *undefined* for the other images. So, IMAGE_BL* belongs to the latter group where we should use #ifdef or #ifndef. Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
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- 05 Dec, 2016 1 commit
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Jeenu Viswambharan authored
There are many instances in ARM Trusted Firmware where control is transferred to functions from which return isn't expected. Such jumps are made using 'bl' instruction to provide the callee with the location from which it was jumped to. Additionally, debuggers infer the caller by examining where 'lr' register points to. If a 'bl' of the nature described above falls at the end of an assembly function, 'lr' will be left pointing to a location outside of the function range. This misleads the debugger back trace. This patch defines a 'no_ret' macro to be used when jumping to functions from which return isn't expected. The macro ensures to use 'bl' instruction for the jump, and also, for debug builds, places a 'nop' instruction immediately thereafter (unless instructed otherwise) so as to leave 'lr' pointing within the function range. Change-Id: Ib34c69fc09197cfd57bc06e147cc8252910e01b0 Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>
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- 09 Nov, 2016 1 commit
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David Cunado authored
In order to avoid unexpected traps into EL3/MON mode, this patch resets the debug registers, MDCR_EL3 and MDCR_EL2 for AArch64, and SDCR and HDCR for AArch32. MDCR_EL3/SDCR is zero'ed when EL3/MON mode is entered, at the start of BL1 and BL31/SMP_MIN. For MDCR_EL2/HDCR, this patch zero's the bits that are architecturally UNKNOWN values on reset. This is done when exiting from EL3/MON mode but only on platforms that support EL2/HYP mode but choose to exit to EL1/SVC mode. Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#430 Change-Id: Idb992232163c072faa08892251b5626ae4c3a5b6 Signed-off-by: David Cunado <david.cunado@arm.com>
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- 19 Jul, 2016 1 commit
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Soby Mathew authored
This patch moves assembler macros which are not architecture specific to a new file `asm_macros_common.S` and moves the `el3_common_macros.S` into `aarch64` specific folder. Change-Id: I444a1ee3346597bf26a8b827480cd9640b38c826
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- 18 Jul, 2016 1 commit
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Soby Mathew authored
This patch moves the PSCI services and BL31 frameworks like context management and per-cpu data into new library components `PSCI` and `el3_runtime` respectively. This enables PSCI to be built independently from BL31. A new `psci_lib.mk` makefile is introduced which adds the relevant PSCI library sources and gets included by `bl31.mk`. Other changes which are done as part of this patch are: * The runtime services framework is now moved to the `common/` folder to enable reuse. * The `asm_macros.S` and `assert_macros.S` helpers are moved to architecture specific folder. * The `plat_psci_common.c` is moved from the `plat/common/aarch64/` folder to `plat/common` folder. The original file location now has a stub which just includes the file from new location to maintain platform compatibility. Most of the changes wouldn't affect platform builds as they just involve changes to the generic bl1.mk and bl31.mk makefiles. NOTE: THE `plat_psci_common.c` FILE HAS MOVED LOCATION AND THE STUB FILE AT THE ORIGINAL LOCATION IS NOW DEPRECATED. PLATFORMS SHOULD MODIFY THEIR MAKEFILES TO INCLUDE THE FILE FROM THE NEW LOCATION. Change-Id: I6bd87d5b59424995c6a65ef8076d4fda91ad5e86
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