1. 15 Oct, 2018 1 commit
  2. 28 Sep, 2018 1 commit
  3. 05 Sep, 2018 2 commits
    • Varun Wadekar's avatar
      cpus: denver: Implement static workaround for CVE-2018-3639 · 6cf8d65f
      Varun Wadekar authored
      
      
      For Denver CPUs, this approach enables the mitigation during EL3
      initialization, following every PE reset. No mechanism is provided to
      disable the mitigation at runtime.
      
      This approach permanently mitigates the EL3 software stack only. Other
      software components are responsible to enable it for their exception
      levels.
      
      TF-A implements this approach for the Denver CPUs with DENVER_MIDR_PN3
      and earlier:
      
      *   By setting bit 11 (Disable speculative store buffering) of
          `ACTLR_EL3`
      
      *   By setting bit 9 (Disable speculative memory disambiguation) of
          `ACTLR_EL3`
      
      TF-A implements this approach for the Denver CPUs with DENVER_MIDR_PN4
      and later:
      
      *   By setting bit 18 (Disable speculative store buffering) of
          `ACTLR_EL3`
      
      *   By setting bit 17 (Disable speculative memory disambiguation) of
          `ACTLR_EL3`
      
      Change-Id: If1de96605ce3f7b0aff5fab2c828e5aecb687555
      Signed-off-by: default avatarVarun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com>
      6cf8d65f
    • Varun Wadekar's avatar
      cpus: denver: reset power state to 'C1' on boot · cf3ed0dc
      Varun Wadekar authored
      
      
      Denver CPUs expect the power state field to be reset to 'C1'
      during boot. This patch updates the reset handler to reset the
      ACTLR_.PMSTATE field to 'C1' state during CPU boot.
      
      Change-Id: I7cb629627a4dd1a30ec5cbb3a5e90055244fe30c
      Signed-off-by: default avatarVarun Wadekar <vwadekar@nvidia.com>
      cf3ed0dc
  4. 17 Aug, 2018 1 commit
  5. 18 Jul, 2018 1 commit
  6. 11 Jul, 2018 4 commits
  7. 08 Jun, 2018 4 commits
  8. 23 May, 2018 4 commits
    • Dimitris Papastamos's avatar
      Add support for dynamic mitigation for CVE-2018-3639 · fe007b2e
      Dimitris Papastamos authored
      
      
      Some CPUS may benefit from using a dynamic mitigation approach for
      CVE-2018-3639.  A new SMC interface is defined to allow software
      executing in lower ELs to enable or disable the mitigation for their
      execution context.
      
      It should be noted that regardless of the state of the mitigation for
      lower ELs, code executing in EL3 is always mitigated against
      CVE-2018-3639.
      
      NOTE: This change is a compatibility break for any platform using
      the declare_cpu_ops_workaround_cve_2017_5715 macro.  Migrate to
      the declare_cpu_ops_wa macro instead.
      
      Change-Id: I3509a9337ad217bbd96de9f380c4ff8bf7917013
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
      fe007b2e
    • Dimitris Papastamos's avatar
      aarch32: Implement static workaround for CVE-2018-3639 · e0865708
      Dimitris Papastamos authored
      
      
      Implement static mitigation for CVE-2018-3639 on
      Cortex A57 and A72.
      
      Change-Id: I83409a16238729b84142b19e258c23737cc1ddc3
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
      e0865708
    • Dimitris Papastamos's avatar
      Implement static workaround for CVE-2018-3639 · b8a25bbb
      Dimitris Papastamos authored
      For affected CPUs, this approach enables the mitigation during EL3
      initialization, following every PE reset. No mechanism is provided to
      disable the mitigation at runtime.
      
      This approach permanently mitigates the entire software stack and no
      additional mitigation code is required in other software components.
      
      TF-A implements this approach for the following affected CPUs:
      
      *   Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72, by setting bit 55 (Disable load pass store) of
          `CPUACTLR_EL1` (`S3_1_C15_C2_0`).
      
      *   Cortex-A73, by setting bit 3 of `S3_0_C15_C0_0` (not documented in the
          Technical Reference Manual (TRM)).
      
      *   Cortex-A75, by setting bit 35 (reserved in TRM) of `CPUACTLR_EL1`
          (`S3_0_C15_C1_0`).
      
      Additionally, a new SMC interface is implemented to allow software
      executing in lower ELs to discover whether the system is mitigated
      against CVE-2018-3639.
      
      Refer to "Firmware interfaces for mitigating cache speculation
      vulnerabilities System Software on Arm Systems"[0] for more
      information.
      
      [0] https://developer.arm.com/cache-speculation-vulnerability-firmware-specification
      
      
      
      Change-Id: I084aa7c3bc7c26bf2df2248301270f77bed22ceb
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
      b8a25bbb
    • Dimitris Papastamos's avatar
      Rename symbols and files relating to CVE-2017-5715 · 2c3a1078
      Dimitris Papastamos authored
      
      
      This patch renames symbols and files relating to CVE-2017-5715 to make
      it easier to introduce new symbols and files for new CVE mitigations.
      
      Change-Id: I24c23822862ca73648c772885f1690bed043dbc7
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
      2c3a1078
  9. 12 Apr, 2018 1 commit
  10. 14 Mar, 2018 2 commits
  11. 28 Feb, 2018 1 commit
  12. 27 Feb, 2018 3 commits
  13. 18 Jan, 2018 2 commits
    • Dimitris Papastamos's avatar
      Workaround for CVE-2017-5715 for Cortex A9, A15 and A17 · e4b34efa
      Dimitris Papastamos authored
      
      
      A per-cpu vbar is installed that implements the workaround by
      invalidating the branch target buffer (BTB) directly in the case of A9
      and A17 and indirectly by invalidating the icache in the case of A15.
      
      For Cortex A57 and A72 there is currently no workaround implemented
      when EL3 is in AArch32 mode so report it as missing.
      
      For other vulnerable CPUs (e.g. Cortex A73 and Cortex A75), there are
      no changes since there is currently no upstream AArch32 EL3 support
      for these CPUs.
      
      Change-Id: Ib42c6ef0b3c9ff2878a9e53839de497ff736258f
      Signed-off-by: default avatarDimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>
      e4b34efa
    • Roberto Vargas's avatar
      bl2-el3: Add BL2_EL3 image · b1d27b48
      Roberto Vargas authored
      
      
      This patch enables BL2 to execute at the highest exception level
      without any dependancy on TF BL1. This enables platforms which already
      have a non-TF Boot ROM to directly load and execute BL2 and subsequent BL
      stages without need for BL1.  This is not currently possible because
      BL2 executes at S-EL1 and cannot jump straight to EL3.
      
      Change-Id: Ief1efca4598560b1b8c8e61fbe26d1f44e929d69
      Signed-off-by: default avatarRoberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>
      b1d27b48
  14. 11 Jan, 2018 1 commit
  15. 29 Nov, 2017 1 commit
  16. 08 Nov, 2017 6 commits
  17. 07 Sep, 2017 2 commits
  18. 29 Aug, 2017 2 commits
  19. 20 Jun, 2017 1 commit