/* * Copyright (c) 2015-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this * list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation * and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * Neither the name of ARM nor the names of its contributors may be used * to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific * prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * X509 parser based on mbed TLS * * This module implements functions to check the integrity of a X509v3 * certificate ASN.1 structure and extract authentication parameters from the * extensions field, such as an image hash or a public key. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* mbed TLS headers */ #include #include #include /* Maximum OID string length ("a.b.c.d.e.f ...") */ #define MAX_OID_STR_LEN 64 #define LIB_NAME "mbed TLS X509v3" /* Temporary variables to speed up the authentication parameters search. These * variables are assigned once during the integrity check and used any time an * authentication parameter is requested, so we do not have to parse the image * again */ static mbedtls_asn1_buf tbs; static mbedtls_asn1_buf v3_ext; static mbedtls_asn1_buf pk; static mbedtls_asn1_buf sig_alg; static mbedtls_asn1_buf signature; /* * Clear all static temporary variables. */ static void clear_temp_vars(void) { #define ZERO_AND_CLEAN(x) \ do { \ zeromem(&x, sizeof(x)); \ clean_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&x, sizeof(x)); \ } while (0); ZERO_AND_CLEAN(tbs) ZERO_AND_CLEAN(v3_ext); ZERO_AND_CLEAN(pk); ZERO_AND_CLEAN(sig_alg); ZERO_AND_CLEAN(signature); #undef ZERO_AND_CLEAN } /* * Get X509v3 extension * * Global variable 'v3_ext' must point to the extensions region * in the certificate. No need to check for errors since the image has passed * the integrity check. */ static int get_ext(const char *oid, void **ext, unsigned int *ext_len) { int oid_len; size_t len; unsigned char *end_ext_data, *end_ext_octet; unsigned char *p; const unsigned char *end; char oid_str[MAX_OID_STR_LEN]; mbedtls_asn1_buf extn_oid; int is_critical; assert(oid != NULL); p = v3_ext.p; end = v3_ext.p + v3_ext.len; mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); while (p < end) { zeromem(&extn_oid, sizeof(extn_oid)); is_critical = 0; /* DEFAULT FALSE */ mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); end_ext_data = p + len; /* Get extension ID */ extn_oid.tag = *p; mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &extn_oid.len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID); extn_oid.p = p; p += extn_oid.len; /* Get optional critical */ mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(&p, end_ext_data, &is_critical); /* Extension data */ mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end_ext_data, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); end_ext_octet = p + len; /* Detect requested extension */ oid_len = mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string(oid_str, MAX_OID_STR_LEN, &extn_oid); if (oid_len == MBEDTLS_ERR_OID_BUF_TOO_SMALL) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR; } if ((oid_len == strlen(oid_str)) && !strcmp(oid, oid_str)) { *ext = (void *)p; *ext_len = (unsigned int)len; return IMG_PARSER_OK; } /* Next */ p = end_ext_octet; } return IMG_PARSER_ERR_NOT_FOUND; } /* * Check the integrity of the certificate ASN.1 structure. * * Extract the relevant data that will be used later during authentication. * * This function doesn't clear the static variables located on the top of this * file in case of an error. It is only called from check_integrity(), which * performs the cleanup if necessary. */ static int cert_parse(void *img, unsigned int img_len) { int ret, is_critical; size_t len; unsigned char *p, *end, *crt_end; mbedtls_asn1_buf sig_alg1, sig_alg2; p = (unsigned char *)img; len = img_len; end = p + len; /* * Certificate ::= SEQUENCE { * tbsCertificate TBSCertificate, * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, * signatureValue BIT STRING } */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } if (len > (size_t)(end - p)) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } crt_end = p + len; /* * TBSCertificate ::= SEQUENCE { */ tbs.p = p; ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } end = p + len; tbs.len = end - tbs.p; /* * Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } p += len; /* * CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_INTEGER); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } p += len; /* * signature AlgorithmIdentifier */ sig_alg1.p = p; ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } if ((end - p) < 1) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } sig_alg1.len = (p + len) - sig_alg1.p; p += len; /* * issuer Name */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } p += len; /* * Validity ::= SEQUENCE { * notBefore Time, * notAfter Time } * */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } p += len; /* * subject Name */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } p += len; /* * SubjectPublicKeyInfo */ pk.p = p; ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } pk.len = (p + len) - pk.p; p += len; /* * issuerUniqueID [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1); if (ret != 0) { if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } } else { p += len; } /* * subjectUniqueID [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 2); if (ret != 0) { if (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } } else { p += len; } /* * extensions [3] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 3); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } /* * Extensions ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Extension */ v3_ext.p = p; ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } v3_ext.len = (p + len) - v3_ext.p; /* * Check extensions integrity */ while (p < end) { ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } /* Get extension ID */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } p += len; /* Get optional critical */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_bool(&p, end, &is_critical); if ((ret != 0) && (ret != MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_UNEXPECTED_TAG)) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } /* Data should be octet string type */ ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } p += len; } if (p != end) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } end = crt_end; /* * } * -- end of TBSCertificate * * signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier */ sig_alg2.p = p; ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } if ((end - p) < 1) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } sig_alg2.len = (p + len) - sig_alg2.p; p += len; /* Compare both signature algorithms */ if (sig_alg1.len != sig_alg2.len) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } if (0 != timingsafe_bcmp(sig_alg1.p, sig_alg2.p, sig_alg1.len)) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } memcpy(&sig_alg, &sig_alg1, sizeof(sig_alg)); /* * signatureValue BIT STRING */ signature.p = p; ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag(&p, end, &len, MBEDTLS_ASN1_BIT_STRING); if (ret != 0) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } signature.len = (p + len) - signature.p; p += len; /* Check certificate length */ if (p != end) { return IMG_PARSER_ERR_FORMAT; } return IMG_PARSER_OK; } /* Exported functions */ static void init(void) { mbedtls_init(); } /* * Wrapper for cert_parse() that clears the static variables used by it in case * of an error. */ static int check_integrity(void *img, unsigned int img_len) { int rc = cert_parse(img, img_len); if (rc != IMG_PARSER_OK) clear_temp_vars(); return rc; } /* * Extract an authentication parameter from an X509v3 certificate * * This function returns a pointer to the extracted data and its length. * Depending on the type of parameter, a pointer to the data stored in the * certificate may be returned (i.e. an octet string containing a hash). Other * data may need to be copied and formatted (i.e. integers). In the later case, * a buffer of the correct type needs to be statically allocated, filled and * returned. */ static int get_auth_param(const auth_param_type_desc_t *type_desc, void *img, unsigned int img_len, void **param, unsigned int *param_len) { int rc = IMG_PARSER_OK; /* We do not use img because the check_integrity function has already * extracted the relevant data (v3_ext, pk, sig_alg, etc) */ switch (type_desc->type) { case AUTH_PARAM_RAW_DATA: /* Data to be signed */ *param = (void *)tbs.p; *param_len = (unsigned int)tbs.len; break; case AUTH_PARAM_HASH: case AUTH_PARAM_NV_CTR: /* All these parameters are included as X509v3 extensions */ rc = get_ext(type_desc->cookie, param, param_len); break; case AUTH_PARAM_PUB_KEY: if (type_desc->cookie != 0) { /* Get public key from extension */ rc = get_ext(type_desc->cookie, param, param_len); } else { /* Get the subject public key */ *param = (void *)pk.p; *param_len = (unsigned int)pk.len; } break; case AUTH_PARAM_SIG_ALG: /* Get the certificate signature algorithm */ *param = (void *)sig_alg.p; *param_len = (unsigned int)sig_alg.len; break; case AUTH_PARAM_SIG: /* Get the certificate signature */ *param = (void *)signature.p; *param_len = (unsigned int)signature.len; break; default: rc = IMG_PARSER_ERR_NOT_FOUND; break; } return rc; } REGISTER_IMG_PARSER_LIB(IMG_CERT, LIB_NAME, init, \ check_integrity, get_auth_param);