Advisory TFV-5 (CVE-2017-15031) =============================== +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ | Title | Not initializing or saving/restoring ``PMCR_EL0`` can leak | | | secure world timing information | +================+=============================================================+ | CVE ID | `CVE-2017-15031`_ | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ | Date | 02 Oct 2017 | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ | Versions | All, up to and including v1.4 | | Affected | | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ | Configurations | All | | Affected | | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ | Impact | Leakage of sensitive secure world timing information | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ | Fix Version | `Pull Request #1127`_ (merged on 18 October 2017) | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ | Credit | Arm | +----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------+ The ``PMCR_EL0`` (Performance Monitors Control Register) provides details of the Performance Monitors implementation, including the number of counters implemented, and configures and controls the counters. If the ``PMCR_EL0.DP`` bit is set to zero, the cycle counter (when enabled) counts during secure world execution, even when prohibited by the debug signals. Since Arm TF does not save and restore ``PMCR_EL0`` when switching between the normal and secure worlds, normal world code can set ``PMCR_EL0.DP`` to zero to cause leakage of secure world timing information. This register should be added to the list of saved/restored registers. Furthermore, ``PMCR_EL0.DP`` has an architecturally ``UNKNOWN`` reset value. Since Arm TF does not initialize this register, it's possible that on at least some implementations, ``PMCR_EL0.DP`` is set to zero by default. This and other bits with an architecturally UNKNOWN reset value should be initialized to sensible default values in the secure context. The same issue exists for the equivalent AArch32 register, ``PMCR``, except that here ``PMCR_EL0.DP`` architecturally resets to zero. .. _CVE-2017-15031: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-15031 .. _Pull Request #1127: https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/pull/1127