GitLab

Revert payment/wechat, sora/claude-max cleanup, fork-only migrations,
and cosmetic changes that were brought in by the release sync commit.
Keep only channel-monitor related improvements:
- PublicSettingsInjectionPayload named struct with drift test
- ChannelMonitorRunner graceful shutdown in wire
- image_output_price in SupportedModelChip
- Simplified buildSelfNavItems in AppSidebar
- Gateway WARN logs for 503 branches

- Extract PublicSettingsInjectionPayload named struct with drift test
- Add channel_monitor_default_interval_seconds to SSR injection
- Add image_output_price to SupportedModelChip
- Simplify AppSidebar buildSelfNavItems (admins see available channels)
- Add gateway WARN logs for 503 no-available-accounts branches
- Wire ChannelMonitorRunner into provideCleanup for graceful shutdown
- Add migrations 130/131 (CC template userid fix + mimicry field cleanup)
- Clean up fork-only features (sora, claude max simulation, client affinity)
- Remove ~320 obsolete i18n keys
- Add codexUsage utility, WechatServiceButton, BulkEditAccountModal
- Tidy go.sum

Admin GET /api/v1/admin/payment/providers previously returned every
config value — including privateKey / apiV3Key / secretKey etc. —
verbatim. Any future XSS on the admin UI would hand attackers the
full set of production payment credentials, and the plaintext values
sat unnecessarily in browser memory for every operator.

Treat those fields as write-only from the admin surface:

- decryptAndMaskConfig() strips sensitive keys from the GET response.
  The authoritative list is an explicit per-provider registry that
  mirrors the frontend's PROVIDER_CONFIG_FIELDS sensitive flag:
    alipay   → privateKey, publicKey, alipayPublicKey
    wxpay    → privateKey, apiV3Key, publicKey
    stripe   → secretKey, webhookSecret (publishableKey stays plain)
    easypay  → pkey
  Payment runtime still reads the full config via decryptConfig, so
  nothing at the gateway changes.

- mergeConfig() treats an empty value for a sensitive key as "leave
  unchanged" — the admin UI omits unchanged secrets so operators can
  tweak non-sensitive settings without re-entering credentials.

- Admin dialog (PaymentProviderDialog.vue):
  * secret inputs get autocomplete="new-password", data-1p-ignore,
    data-lpignore and data-bwignore so password managers do not
    offer to save provider credentials
  * in edit mode the required-field check skips sensitive fields
    (empty is the "keep existing" signal) and the placeholder shows
    "leave empty to keep" instead of the default example value
  * create mode still requires every non-optional field, including
    secrets, since there is nothing to preserve

- Unit test renamed to TestIsSensitiveProviderConfigField, covers
  the per-provider registry and specifically asserts that Stripe's
  publishableKey is NOT treated as a secret.

allow_user_refund:
- Add allow_user_refund field to PaymentProviderInstance ent schema
- Migration 103: ALTER TABLE payment_provider_instances ADD COLUMN
- Cascade logic: disabling refund_enabled auto-disables allow_user_refund
- User refund validation: check provider instance allows user refund
- Admin refund validation: check provider instance allows admin refund
- Subscription refund: deduct days on refund, rollback on failure
- New endpoint: GET /payment/orders/refund-eligible-providers
- Frontend: ToggleSwitch in ProviderCard/Dialog, cascade in SettingsView

Wildcard matching:
- Change findPricingForModel from "longest prefix wins" to "config order
  priority (first match wins)", aligning with channel service behavior

Add a full payment and subscription system supporting EasyPay (Alipay/WeChat),
Stripe, and direct Alipay/WeChat Pay providers with multi-instance load balancing.