• Juan Castillo's avatar
    Reserve some DDR DRAM for secure use on FVP platforms · 94574b5e
    Juan Castillo authored
    TZC-400 is configured to set the last 16MB of DRAM1 as secure memory and
    the rest of DRAM as non-secure. Non-secure software must not attempt to
    access the 16MB secure area.
    
    Device tree files (sources and binaries) have been updated to match this
    configuration, removing that memory from the Linux physical memory map.
    
    To use UEFI and Linux with this patch, the latest version of UEFI and
    the updated device tree files are required. Check the user guide in the
    documentation for more details.
    
    Replaced magic numbers with #define for memory region definition in the
    platform security initialization function.
    
    Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#149
    
    Change-Id: Ia5d070244aae6c5288ea0e6c8e89d92859522bfe
    94574b5e
plat_security.c 4.85 KB
/*
 * Copyright (c) 2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
 *
 * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
 * list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 *
 * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
 * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
 * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * Neither the name of ARM nor the names of its contributors may be used
 * to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
 * prior written permission.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
 * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
 * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
 * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
 * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
 * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 */

#include <assert.h>
#include <platform.h>
#include <tzc400.h>
#include <debug.h>

/* Used to improve readability for configuring regions. */
#define FILTER_SHIFT(filter)	(1 << filter)

/*
 * For the moment we assume that all security programming is done by the
 * primary core.
 * TODO:
 * Might want to enable interrupt on violations when supported?
 */
void plat_security_setup(void)
{
	tzc_instance_t controller;

	/*
	 * The Base FVP has a TrustZone address space controller, the Foundation
	 * FVP does not. Trying to program the device on the foundation FVP will
	 * cause an abort.
	 *
	 * If the platform had additional peripheral specific security
	 * configurations, those would be configured here.
	 */

	if (!platform_get_cfgvar(CONFIG_HAS_TZC))
		return;

	/*
	 * The TrustZone controller controls access to main DRAM. Give
	 * full NS access for the moment to use with OS.
	 */
	INFO("Configuring TrustZone Controller\n");

	/*
	 * The driver does some error checking and will assert.
	 * - Provide base address of device on platform.
	 * - Provide width of ACE-Lite IDs on platform.
	 */
	controller.base = TZC400_BASE;
	controller.aid_width = FVP_AID_WIDTH;
	tzc_init(&controller);

	/*
	 * Currently only filters 0 and 2 are connected on Base FVP.
	 * Filter 0 : CPU clusters (no access to DRAM by default)
	 * Filter 1 : not connected
	 * Filter 2 : LCDs (access to VRAM allowed by default)
	 * Filter 3 : not connected
	 * Programming unconnected filters will have no effect at the
	 * moment. These filter could, however, be connected in future.
	 * So care should be taken not to configure the unused filters.
	 */

	/* Disable all filters before programming. */
	tzc_disable_filters(&controller);

	/*
	 * Allow only non-secure access to all DRAM to supported devices.
	 * Give access to the CPUs and Virtio. Some devices
	 * would normally use the default ID so allow that too. We use
	 * two regions to cover the blocks of physical memory in the FVPs.
	 *
	 * Software executing in the secure state, such as a secure
	 * boot-loader, can access the DRAM by using the NS attributes in
	 * the MMU translation tables and descriptors.
	 */

	/* Set to cover the first block of DRAM */
	tzc_configure_region(&controller, FILTER_SHIFT(0), 1,
			DRAM1_BASE, DRAM1_END - DRAM1_SEC_SIZE,
			TZC_REGION_S_NONE,
			TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_DEFAULT) |
			TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_PCI) |
			TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_AP) |
			TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_VIRTIO) |
			TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_VIRTIO_OLD));

	/* Set to cover the secure reserved region */
	tzc_configure_region(&controller, FILTER_SHIFT(0), 3,
			(DRAM1_END - DRAM1_SEC_SIZE) + 1 , DRAM1_END,
			TZC_REGION_S_RDWR,
			0x0);

	/* Set to cover the second block of DRAM */
	tzc_configure_region(&controller, FILTER_SHIFT(0), 2,
			DRAM2_BASE, DRAM2_END, TZC_REGION_S_NONE,
			TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_DEFAULT) |
			TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_PCI) |
			TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_AP) |
			TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_VIRTIO) |
			TZC_REGION_ACCESS_RDWR(FVP_NSAID_VIRTIO_OLD));

	/*
	 * TODO: Interrupts are not currently supported. The only
	 * options we have are for access errors to occur quietly or to
	 * cause an exception. We choose to cause an exception.
	 */
	tzc_set_action(&controller, TZC_ACTION_ERR);

	/* Enable filters. */
	tzc_enable_filters(&controller);
}