Prevent speculative execution past ERET
Even though ERET always causes a jump to another address, aarch64 CPUs speculatively execute following instructions as if the ERET instruction was not a jump instruction. The speculative execution does not cross privilege-levels (to the jump target as one would expect), but it continues on the kernel privilege level as if the ERET instruction did not change the control flow - thus execution anything that is accidentally linked after the ERET instruction. Later, the results of this speculative execution are always architecturally discarded, however they can leak data using microarchitectural side channels. This speculative execution is very reliable (seems to be unconditional) and it manages to complete even relatively performance-heavy operations (e.g. multiple dependent fetches from uncached memory). This was fixed in Linux, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and Optee OS: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8 https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/29fb48ace4186a41c409fde52bcf4216e9e50b61 https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/3a08873ece1cb28ace89fd65e8f3c1375cc98de2 https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/abfd092aa19f9c0251e3d5551e2d68a9ebcfec8a It is demonstrated in a SafeSide example: https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/demos/eret_hvc_smc_wrapper.cc https://github.com/google/safeside/blob/master/kernel_modules/kmod_eret_hvc_smc/eret_hvc_smc_module.c Signed-off-by: Anthony Steinhauser <asteinhauser@google.com> Change-Id: Iead39b0b9fb4b8d8b5609daaa8be81497ba63a0f
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