1. 06 Dec, 2017 1 commit
    • Antonio Nino Diaz's avatar
      SPM: Move S-EL1/S-EL0 xlat tables to TZC DRAM · 45d640f0
      Antonio Nino Diaz authored
      
      
      A new platform define, `PLAT_SP_IMAGE_XLAT_SECTION_NAME`, has been
      introduced to select the section where the translation tables used by
      the S-EL1/S-EL0 are placed.
      
      This define has been used to move the translation tables to DRAM secured
      by TrustZone.
      
      Most of the extra needed space in BL31 when SPM is enabled is due to the
      large size of the translation tables. By moving them to this memory
      region we can save 44 KiB.
      
      A new argument has been added to REGISTER_XLAT_CONTEXT2() to specify the
      region where the translation tables have to be placed by the linker.
      
      Change-Id: Ia81709b4227cb8c92601f0caf258f624c0467719
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAntonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
      45d640f0
  2. 15 Nov, 2017 1 commit
    • Antonio Nino Diaz's avatar
      SPM: Fix calculation of max page granularity · 9efd6e5c
      Antonio Nino Diaz authored
      
      
      The code was incorrectly reading from ID_AA64PRF0_EL1 instead of
      ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 causing the supported granularity sizes returned by the
      code to be wrong.
      
      This wasn't causing any problem because it's just used to check the
      alignment of the base of the buffer shared between Non-secure and Secure
      worlds, and it was aligned to more than 64 KiB, which is the maximum
      granularity supported by the architecture.
      
      Change-Id: Icc0d949d9521cc0ef13afb753825c475ea62d462
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAntonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
      9efd6e5c
  3. 10 Nov, 2017 1 commit
    • Antonio Nino Diaz's avatar
      SPM: Fix pointer to MP info in boot info struct · ff7d0805
      Antonio Nino Diaz authored
      
      
      The MP info struct is placed right after the boot info struct. However,
      when calculating the address of the MP info, the size of the boot info
      struct was being multiplied by the size of the MP boot info. This left
      a big gap of empty space between the structs.
      
      This didn't break any code because the boot info struct has a pointer to
      the MP info struct. It was just wasting space.
      
      Change-Id: I1668e3540d9173261968f6740623549000bd48db
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAntonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
      ff7d0805
  4. 08 Nov, 2017 1 commit
    • Antonio Nino Diaz's avatar
      SPM: Introduce Secure Partition Manager · 2fccb228
      Antonio Nino Diaz authored
      
      
      A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in
      S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security
      services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure
      Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be
      granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a
      software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in
      the Secure World and accesses the following system resources:
      
      - Memory and device regions in the system address map.
      - PE system registers.
      - A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts.
      - A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers.
      
      A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the
      absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in
      a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation
      cannot be overly complex.
      
      The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure
      Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is
      responsible for the following:
      
      - Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition.
      - Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a
        Secure Partition.
      - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world
        and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a
        Secure Partition.
      - Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure
        Partition to fulfil service requests.
      - Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure
        Partition to fulfil a service request.
      
      Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f
      Co-authored-by: default avatarDouglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
      Co-authored-by: default avatarSandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
      Co-authored-by: default avatarAchin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
      Co-authored-by: default avatarAntonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarAntonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
      2fccb228