GitLab

The function arm_validate_ns_entrypoint() validates a given non-secure
physical address. This function however specifically returns PSCI error
codes.

Non-secure physical address validation is potentially useful across ARM
platforms, even for non-PSCI use cases. Therefore make this function
common by returning 0 for success or -1 otherwise.

Having made the function common, make arm_validate_psci_entrypoint() a
wrapper around arm_validate_ns_entrypoint() which only translates return
value into PSCI error codes. This wrapper is now used where
arm_validate_ns_entrypoint() was currently used for PSCI entry point
validation.

Change-Id: Ic781fc3105d6d199fd8f53f01aba5baea0ebc310
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

The implementation currently supports only interrupt-based SDEI events,
and supports all interfaces as defined by SDEI specification version
1.0 [1].

Introduce the build option SDEI_SUPPORT to include SDEI dispatcher in
BL31.

Update user guide and porting guide. SDEI documentation to follow.

[1] http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0054a/ARM_DEN0054A_Software_Delegated_Exception_Interface.pdf



Change-Id: I758b733084e4ea3b27ac77d0259705565842241a
Co-authored-by: Yousuf A <yousuf.sait@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

On GICv3 systems, as a side effect of adding provision to handle EL3
interrupts (unconditionally routing FIQs to EL3), pending Non-secure
interrupts (signalled as FIQs) may preempt execution in lower Secure ELs
[1]. This will inadvertently disrupt the semantics of Fast SMC
(previously called Atomic SMC) calls.

To retain semantics of Fast SMCs, the GIC PMR must be programmed to
prevent Non-secure interrupts from preempting Secure execution. To that
effect, two new functions in the Exception Handling Framework subscribe
to events introduced in an earlier commit:

  - Upon 'cm_exited_normal_world', the Non-secure PMR is stashed, and
    the PMR is programmed to the highest Non-secure interrupt priority.

  - Upon 'cm_entering_normal_world', the previously stashed Non-secure
    PMR is restored.

The above sequence however prevents Yielding SMCs from being preempted
by Non-secure interrupts as intended. To facilitate this, the public API
exc_allow_ns_preemption() is introduced that programs the PMR to the
original Non-secure PMR value. Another API
exc_is_ns_preemption_allowed() is also introduced to check if
exc_allow_ns_preemption() had been called previously.

API documentation to follow.

[1] On GICv2 systems, this isn't a problem as, unlike GICv3, pending NS
    IRQs during Secure execution are signalled as IRQs, which aren't
    routed to EL3.

Change-Id: Ief96b162b0067179b1012332cd991ee1b3051dd0
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

EHF is a framework that allows dispatching of EL3 interrupts to their
respective handlers in EL3.

This framework facilitates the firmware-first error handling policy in
which asynchronous exceptions may be routed to EL3. Such exceptions may
be handed over to respective exception handlers. Individual handlers
might further delegate exception handling to lower ELs.

The framework associates the delegated execution to lower ELs with a
priority value. For interrupts, this corresponds to the priorities
programmed in GIC; for other types of exceptions, viz. SErrors or
Synchronous External Aborts, individual dispatchers shall explicitly
associate delegation to a secure priority. In order to prevent lower
priority interrupts from preempting higher priority execution, the
framework provides helpers to control preemption by virtue of
programming Priority Mask register in the interrupt controller.

This commit allows for handling interrupts targeted at EL3. Exception
handlers own interrupts by assigning them a range of secure priorities,
and registering handlers for each priority range it owns.

Support for exception handling in BL31 image is enabled by setting the
build option EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1.

Documentation to follow.

NOTE: The framework assumes the priority scheme supported by platform
interrupt controller is compliant with that of ARM GIC architecture (v2
or later).

Change-Id: I7224337e4cea47c6ca7d7a4ca22a3716939f7e42
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

Acknowledging interrupt shall return a raw value from the interrupt
controller in which the actual interrupt ID may be encoded. Add a
platform API to extract the actual interrupt ID from the raw value
obtained from interrupt controller.

Document the new function. Also clarify the semantics of interrupt
acknowledge.

Change-Id: I818dad7be47661658b16f9807877d259eb127405
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

At present, the GIC drivers enable Group 0 interrupts only if there are
Secure SPIs listed in the interrupt properties/list. This means that,
even if there are Group 0 SGIs/PPIs configured, the group remained
disabled in the absence of a Group 0 SPI.

Modify both GICv2 and GICv3 SGI/PPI configuration to enable Group 0 when
corresponding SGIs/PPIs are present.

Change-Id: Id123e8aaee0c22b476eebe3800340906d83bbc6d
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

This patch brings in the following fixes:

  - The per-PE target data initialized during power up needs to be
    flushed so as to be visible to other PEs.

  - Setup per-PE target data for the primary PE as well. At present,
    this was only setup for secondary PEs when they were powered on.

Change-Id: Ibe3a57c14864e37b2326dd7ab321a5c7bf80e8af
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

SPM: Fix pointer to MP info in boot info struct

The MP info struct is placed right after the boot info struct. However,
when calculating the address of the MP info, the size of the boot info
struct was being multiplied by the size of the MP boot info. This left
a big gap of empty space between the structs.

This didn't break any code because the boot info struct has a pointer to
the MP info struct. It was just wasting space.

Change-Id: I1668e3540d9173261968f6740623549000bd48db
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

Introduce Secure Partition Manager

This initial port of the Secure Partitions Manager to FVP supports BL31
in both SRAM and Trusted DRAM.

A document with instructions to build the SPM has been added.

Change-Id: I4ea83ff0a659be77f2cd72eaf2302cdf8ba98b32
Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in
S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security
services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure
Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be
granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a
software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in
the Secure World and accesses the following system resources:

- Memory and device regions in the system address map.
- PE system registers.
- A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts.
- A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers.

A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the
absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in
a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation
cannot be overly complex.

The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure
Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is
responsible for the following:

- Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a
  Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world
  and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a
  Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure
  Partition to fulfil service requests.
- Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure
  Partition to fulfil a service request.

Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f
Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

This function can be useful to setup TCR_ELx by callers that don't use
the translation tables library to setup the system registers related
to them. By making it common, it can be reused whenever it is needed
without duplicating code.

Change-Id: Ibfada9e846d2a6cd113b1925ac911bb27327d375
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

A line in the upstream SPDs is only compiled in in `DEBUG` builds. This
line is used to help with assertions and so assertion failures can
happen in release builds with assertions enabled. Use
`ENABLE_ASSERTIONS` instead of `DEBUG`.

This bug was introduced in commit aa61368e

, which introduced the build
option `ENABLE_ASSERTIONS`.

Change-Id: I7977df9c89c68677b00099b2a1926fa3cb0937c6
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

Fix PSCI STAT time stamp collection

Fix build error when creating ROT key for UniPhier platform

Building the UniPhier platform in parallel with TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1
could fail due to non-existing directory.  It might be difficult to
reproduce, but here is an easier way to trigger the problem:

$ make PLAT=uniphier TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1 MBEDTLS_DIR=mbedtls certificates
  OPENSSL build/uniphier/release/rot_key.pem
/bin/sh: 1: cannot create build/uniphier/release/rot_key.pem: Directory nonexistent
make: *** [build/uniphier/release/rot_key.pem] Error 2

The $(ROT_KEY) must depend on $(BUILD_PLAT) so that the build directory
is created before the key.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>

Some platforms (for ex. UniPhier) want to create files in the very
top of the build directory.  Add ${BUILD_PLAT} so such files can
depend on it.

Make existing directory targets depend on ${BUILD_PLAT} because
they are sub-directories of ${BUILD_PLAT}.
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>

Avoid use of undefined macros

Change sizeof to use type of struct not function

qemu: update deprecated interrupt registering

This patch includes various fixes for PSCI STAT functionality
relating to timestamp collection:

1. The PSCI stat accounting for retention states for higher level
power domains were done outside the locks which could lead to
spurious values in some race conditions. This is moved inside
the locks. Also, the call to start the stat accounting was redundant
which is now removed.

2. The timestamp wrap-around case when calculating residency did
not cater for AArch32. This is now fixed.

3. In the warm boot path, `plat_psci_stat_accounting_stop()` was
getting invoked prior to population of target power states. This
is now corrected.

Change-Id: I851526455304fb74ff0a724f4d5318cd89e19589
Signed-off-by: Soby Mathew <soby.mathew@arm.com>

Enable GICv3 save for ARM platforms

Registered interrupts are configured in edge detection as the default
previous configuration assumed in previous code.

Not target mask required as Qemu BL31 will not send/route SGIs.
Signed-off-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>

aarch64: Add PubSub events to capture security state transitions

These macros are only defined for corresponding image,
and they are undefined for other images. It means that we have
to use ifdef or defined() instead of relying on being 0 by default.

Change-Id: Iad11efab9830ddf471599b46286e1c56581ef5a7
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>

ARM_TSP_RAM_LOCATION_ID was defined only in AARCH64, but the macro
was also used in AARCH32, and it meant that it was taking the value 0,
which happened to equal ARM_TRUSTED_SRAM_ID.

Change-Id: If9f4dbee1a2ba15e7806f2a03305b554bd327363
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>

debug.S was using macros defined in debug.h, but since it didn't
include it, these macros were taking the value 0, which means that
all the preprocessor conditionals were wrong.

Change-Id: If4ca81cc5a1662991589f914a2557ceff0eaaede
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>

Add FWU booting instructions to the user guide

Add platform hooks for boot redundancy support

Change sizeof call so it references a static type instead of return of
a function in order to be MISRA compliant.

Change-Id: I6f1adb206073d6cd200156e281b8d76249e3af0e
Signed-off-by: Joel Hutton <joel.hutton@arm.com>

Add events that trigger before entry to normal/secure world.  The
events trigger after the normal/secure context has been restored.

Similarly add events that trigger after leaving normal/secure world.
The events trigger after the normal/secure context has been saved.

Change-Id: I1b48a7ea005d56b1f25e2b5313d77e67d2f02bc5
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>

FWU uses additional images that have to be loaded,
and this patch adds the documentation of how to do
it in FVP and Juno.

Change-Id: I1a40641c11c5a4c8db0aadeaeb2bec30c9279e28
Signed-off-by: Roberto Vargas <roberto.vargas@arm.com>

Change the default option of ARM_TSP_RAM_LOCATION and Enlarge the BL2 size on ARM platforms

qemu/optee: load OP-TEE pageable part 2MB above OP-TEE image

qemu: fix holding pen mailbox sequence

OP-TEE dedicates the end of the Qemu secure DRAM as specific out-of-TEE
secure RAM. To support this configuration the trusted firmware should
not load OP-TEE resources in this area.

To overcome the issue, OP-TEE pageable image is now loaded 2MByte above
the secure RAM base address.
Signed-off-by: Etienne Carriere <etienne.carriere@linaro.org>

qemu: Add support for Trusted Board Boot

This patch adds support for TBB to qemu. An RSA ROT keypair is generated at
build time and is included into BL1/BL2. The key and content certificates
are read over semihosting.

Fixes ARM-software/tf-issues#526
Signed-off-by: Michalis Pappas <mpappas@fastmail.fm>

For Trusted Board Boot, BL2 needs more space to support the ECDSA
and ECDSA+RSA algorithms.

Change-Id: Ie7eda9a1315ce836dbc6d18d6588f8d17891a92d
Signed-off-by: Qixiang Xu <qixiang.xu@arm.com>