1. 24 Feb, 2020 1 commit
    • Sandrine Bailleux's avatar
      Introduce a new "dualroot" chain of trust · 5ab8b717
      Sandrine Bailleux authored
      
      
      This new chain of trust defines 2 independent signing domains:
      
      1) One for the silicon firmware (BL1, BL2, BL31) and optionally the
         Trusted OS. It is rooted in the Silicon ROTPK, just as in the TBBR
         CoT.
      
      2) One for the Normal World Bootloader (BL33). It is rooted in a new key
         called Platform ROTPK, or PROTPK for short.
      
      In terms of certificates chain,
      
      - Signing domain 1) is similar to what TBBR advocates (see page 21 of
        the TBBR specification), except that the Non-Trusted World Public Key
        has been removed from the Trusted Key Certificate.
      
      - Signing domain 2) only contains the Non-Trusted World Content
        certificate, which provides the hash of the Non-Trusted World
        Bootloader. Compared to the TBBR CoT, there's no Non-Trusted World
        Key certificate for simplicity.
      
      Change-Id: I62f1e952522d84470acc360cf5ee63e4c4b0b4d9
      Signed-off-by: default avatarSandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
      5ab8b717