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These changes address most of the required MISRA rules. In the process,
some from generic code is also fixed.

No functional changes.

Change-Id: I6235a355e006f0b1c7c1c4d811b3964a64d0434f
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

SDEI event dispatches currently only sets up the Non-secure context
before returning to the caller. The actual dispatch only happens upon
exiting EL3 next time.

However, for various error handling scenarios, it's beneficial to have
the dispatch happen synchronously. I.e. when receiving SDEI interrupt,
or for a successful sdei_dispatch_event() call, the event handler is
executed; and upon the event completion, dispatcher execution resumes
after the point of dispatch. The jump primitives introduced in the
earlier patch facilitates this feature.

With this patch:

  - SDEI interrupts and calls to sdei_dispatch_event prepares the NS
    context for event dispatch, then sets a jump point, and immediately
    exits EL3. This results in the client handler executing in
    Non-secure.

  - When the SDEI client completes the dispatched event, the SDEI
    dispatcher does a longjmp to the jump pointer created earlier. For
    the caller of the sdei_dispatch_event() in particular, this would
    appear as if call returned successfully.

The dynamic workaround for CVE_2018_3639 is slightly shifted around as
part of related minor refactoring. It doesn't affect the workaround
functionality.

Documentation updated.

NOTE: This breaks the semantics of the explicit dispatch API, and any
exiting usages should be carefully reviewed.

Change-Id: Ib9c876d27ea2af7fb22de49832e55a0da83da3f9
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

The current macros only allow to define dynamic and statically-bound
SDEI events. However, there ought be a mechanism to define SDEI events
that are explicitly dispatched; i.e., events that are dispatched as a
result of a previous secure interrupt or other exception

This patch introduces SDEI_EXPLICIT_EVENT() macro to define an explicit
event. They must be placed under private mappings. Only the priority
flags are allowed to be additionally specified.

Documentation updated.

Change-Id: I2e12f5571381195d6234c9dfbd5904608ad41db3
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

It may be needed to enter the Secure Partition through other means than
an MM_COMMUNICATE SMC. This patch enables this behaviour by extracting
the necessary code from mm_communicate() and allowing other parts of the
code to use it.

Change-Id: I59f6638d22d9c9d0baff0984f39d056298a8dc8e
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

The translation tables allocated for the Secure Partition do not need
to be treated as a special case. They can be put amongst the other
tables mapping BL31's general purpose memory. They will be mapped with
the same attributes as them, which is fine.

The explicit alignment constraint in BL31's linker script to pad the
last page of memory allocated to the Secure Partition's translation
tables is useless too, as page tables are per se pages, thus their
end address is naturally aligned on a page-boundary.

In fact, this patch does not change the existing behaviour. Since
patch 22282bb6

 ("SPM: Move all SP-related info to SP context
struct"), the secure_partition.c file has been renamed into sp_xlat.c
but the linker script has not been properly updated. As a result, the
SP translation tables are not specifically put at the start of the
xlat_table linker section, the __SP_IMAGE_XLAT_TABLES_START__/_END__
symbols have the same value, the size of the resulting mmap_region
covering these xlat tables is 0 and so it is ignored.

Change-Id: I4cf0a4cc090298811cca53fc9cee74df0f2b1512
Signed-off-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>

Move all information related to a Secure Partition to the struct
secure_partition_context_t.

This requires an in-depth refactor because most of the previous code of
SPM relied on global information.

Change-Id: I0a23e93817dcc191ce1d7506b8bc671d376123c4
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

For affected CPUs, this approach enables the mitigation during EL3
initialization, following every PE reset. No mechanism is provided to
disable the mitigation at runtime.

This approach permanently mitigates the entire software stack and no
additional mitigation code is required in other software components.

TF-A implements this approach for the following affected CPUs:

*   Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72, by setting bit 55 (Disable load pass store) of
    `CPUACTLR_EL1` (`S3_1_C15_C2_0`).

*   Cortex-A73, by setting bit 3 of `S3_0_C15_C0_0` (not documented in the
    Technical Reference Manual (TRM)).

*   Cortex-A75, by setting bit 35 (reserved in TRM) of `CPUACTLR_EL1`
    (`S3_0_C15_C1_0`).

Additionally, a new SMC interface is implemented to allow software
executing in lower ELs to discover whether the system is mitigated
against CVE-2018-3639.

Refer to "Firmware interfaces for mitigating cache speculation
vulnerabilities System Software on Arm Systems"[0] for more
information.

[0] https://developer.arm.com/cache-speculation-vulnerability-firmware-specification



Change-Id: I084aa7c3bc7c26bf2df2248301270f77bed22ceb
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>

Void pointers have been used to access linker symbols, by declaring an
extern pointer, then taking the address of it. This limits symbols
values to aligned pointer values. To remove this restriction an
IMPORT_SYM macro has been introduced, which declares it as a char
pointer and casts it to the required type.

Change-Id: I89877fc3b13ed311817bb8ba79d4872b89bfd3b0
Signed-off-by: Joel Hutton <Joel.Hutton@Arm.com>

SMCCC v1.1 comes with a relaxed calling convention for AArch64
callers.  The caller only needs to save x0-x3 before doing an SMC
call.

This patch adds support for SMCCC_VERSION and SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES.

Refer to "Firmware Interfaces for mitigating CVE_2017_5715 System
Software on Arm Systems"[0] for more information.

[0] https://developer.arm.com/-/media/developer/pdf/ARM%20DEN%200070A%20Firmware%20interfaces%20for%20mitigating%20CVE-2017-5715_V1.0.pdf



Change-Id: If5b1c55c17d6c5c7cb9c2c3ed355d3a91cdad0a9
Signed-off-by: Dimitris Papastamos <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>

The secure_partition_boot_info_t structure is used to communicate boot
parameters with the StandaloneMM code executing at S-EL0 through a
shared buffer. Certain data types used for members of this structure
are opaque with their size depending on the toolchain being used.

Declare the members of the structure with explicit width based data
types, which would maintain compatibility across toolchains.
Signed-off-by: Sughosh Ganu <sughosh.ganu@arm.com>

Rename SP_VERSION macros to MM_VERSION, which is the name used in the MM
specification [1]. Also, a few more helper macros have been added.

MM-specific definitions have been moved to their own header file.

[1] http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0060a/DEN0060A_ARM_MM_Interface_Specification.pdf



Change-Id: Ia10e48c7e81a7a1f5eeca29a5270cae740a4a88a
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

Rename SP_COMMUNICATE_AARCH32/AARCH64 into MM_COMMUNICATE_AARCH32/AARCH64
to align with the MM specification [1].

[1] http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0060a/DEN0060A_ARM_MM_Interface_Specification.pdf



Change-Id: I478aa4024ace7507d14a5d366aa8e20681075b03
Signed-off-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>

The defines have been renamed to match the names used in the
documentation.

Change-Id: I2f18b65112d2db040a89d5a8522e9790c3e21628
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

Register count is currently declared as unsigned, where as there are
asserts in place to check it being negative during unregister. These are
flagged as never being true.

Change-Id: I34f00f0ac5bf88205791e9c1298a175dababe7c8
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

This allows for other EL3 components to schedule an SDEI event dispatch
to Normal world upon the next ERET. The API usage constrains are set out
in the SDEI dispatcher documentation.

Documentation to follow.

Change-Id: Id534bae0fd85afc94523490098c81f85c4e8f019
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

The implementation currently supports only interrupt-based SDEI events,
and supports all interfaces as defined by SDEI specification version
1.0 [1].

Introduce the build option SDEI_SUPPORT to include SDEI dispatcher in
BL31.

Update user guide and porting guide. SDEI documentation to follow.

[1] http://infocenter.arm.com/help/topic/com.arm.doc.den0054a/ARM_DEN0054A_Software_Delegated_Exception_Interface.pdf



Change-Id: I758b733084e4ea3b27ac77d0259705565842241a
Co-authored-by: Yousuf A <yousuf.sait@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeenu Viswambharan <jeenu.viswambharan@arm.com>

A Secure Partition is a software execution environment instantiated in
S-EL0 that can be used to implement simple management and security
services. Since S-EL0 is an unprivileged exception level, a Secure
Partition relies on privileged firmware e.g. ARM Trusted Firmware to be
granted access to system and processor resources. Essentially, it is a
software sandbox that runs under the control of privileged software in
the Secure World and accesses the following system resources:

- Memory and device regions in the system address map.
- PE system registers.
- A range of asynchronous exceptions e.g. interrupts.
- A range of synchronous exceptions e.g. SMC function identifiers.

A Secure Partition enables privileged firmware to implement only the
absolutely essential secure services in EL3 and instantiate the rest in
a partition. Since the partition executes in S-EL0, its implementation
cannot be overly complex.

The component in ARM Trusted Firmware responsible for managing a Secure
Partition is called the Secure Partition Manager (SPM). The SPM is
responsible for the following:

- Validating and allocating resources requested by a Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used for initialising a
  Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used by the normal world
  and other secure services for accessing the services exported by a
  Secure Partition.
- Implementing a well defined interface that is used by a Secure
  Partition to fulfil service requests.
- Instantiating the software execution environment required by a Secure
  Partition to fulfil a service request.

Change-Id: I6f7862d6bba8732db5b73f54e789d717a35e802f
Co-authored-by: Douglas Raillard <douglas.raillard@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Achin Gupta <achin.gupta@arm.com>
Co-authored-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Nino Diaz <antonio.ninodiaz@arm.com>

To make software license auditing simpler, use SPDX[0] license
identifiers instead of duplicating the license text in every file.

NOTE: Files that have been imported by FreeBSD have not been modified.

[0]: https://spdx.org/



Change-Id: I80a00e1f641b8cc075ca5a95b10607ed9ed8761a
Signed-off-by: dp-arm <dimitris.papastamos@arm.com>

This patch moves the invocation of `psci_setup()` from BL31 and SP_MIN
into `std_svc_setup()` as part of ARM Standard Service initialization.
This allows us to consolidate ARM Standard Service initializations which
will be added to in the future. A new function `get_arm_std_svc_args()`
is introduced to get arguments corresponding to each standard service.
This function must be implemented by the EL3 Runtime Firmware and both
SP_MIN and BL31 implement it.

Change-Id: I38e1b644f797fa4089b20574bd4a10f0419de184

This patch introduces the PSCI Library interface. The major changes
introduced are as follows:

* Earlier BL31 was responsible for Architectural initialization during cold
boot via bl31_arch_setup() whereas PSCI was responsible for the same during
warm boot. This functionality is now consolidated by the PSCI library
and it does Architectural initialization via psci_arch_setup() during both
cold and warm boots.

* Earlier the warm boot entry point was always `psci_entrypoint()`. This was
not flexible enough as a library interface. Now PSCI expects the runtime
firmware to provide the entry point via `psci_setup()`. A new function
`bl31_warm_entrypoint` is introduced in BL31 and the previous
`psci_entrypoint()` is deprecated.

* The `smc_helpers.h` is reorganized to separate the SMC Calling Convention
defines from the Trusted Firmware SMC helpers. The former is now in a new
header file `smcc.h` and the SMC helpers are moved to Architecture specific
header.

* The CPU context is used by PSCI for context initialization and
restoration after power down (PSCI Context). It is also used by BL31 for SMC
handling and context management during Normal-Secure world switch (SMC
Context). The `psci_smc_handler()` interface is redefined to not use SMC
helper macros thus enabling to decouple the PSCI context from EL3 runtime
firmware SMC context. This enables PSCI to be integrated with other runtime
firmware using a different SMC context.

NOTE: With this patch the architectural setup done in `bl31_arch_setup()`
is done as part of `psci_setup()` and hence `bl31_platform_setup()` will be
invoked prior to architectural setup. It is highly unlikely that the platform
setup will depend on architectural setup and cause any failure. Please be
be aware of this change in sequence.

Change-Id: I7f497a08d33be234bbb822c28146250cb20dab73

This patch moves the PSCI services and BL31 frameworks like context
management and per-cpu data into new library components `PSCI` and
`el3_runtime` respectively. This enables PSCI to be built independently from
BL31. A new `psci_lib.mk` makefile is introduced which adds the relevant
PSCI library sources and gets included by `bl31.mk`. Other changes which
are done as part of this patch are:

* The runtime services framework is now moved to the `common/` folder to
  enable reuse.
* The `asm_macros.S` and `assert_macros.S` helpers are moved to architecture
  specific folder.
* The `plat_psci_common.c` is moved from the `plat/common/aarch64/` folder
  to `plat/common` folder. The original file location now has a stub which
  just includes the file from new location to maintain platform compatibility.

Most of the changes wouldn't affect platform builds as they just involve
changes to the generic bl1.mk and bl31.mk makefiles.

NOTE: THE `plat_psci_common.c` FILE HAS MOVED LOCATION AND THE STUB FILE AT
THE ORIGINAL LOCATION IS NOW DEPRECATED. PLATFORMS SHOULD MODIFY THEIR
MAKEFILES TO INCLUDE THE FILE FROM THE NEW LOCATION.

Change-Id: I6bd87d5b59424995c6a65ef8076d4fda91ad5e86